CSSF Updates 2026

Key dates

2026-05-11

European Commission published its report on the adequacy of the MMFR and identified market-resilience WLA levels of 20% for VNAV MMFs and 40% for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs.

2026-06-08

CSSF launched its consultation on Guidance on Money Market Fund Weekly Liquid Asset Levels.

2026-08-03 Deadline

Deadline for stakeholders to submit responses to the CSSF consultation.

2026-10-30

CSSF published the IMMFA consultation response and final guidance, and announced a three-month implementation period.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should classify each affected MMF by VNAV, public debt CNAV or LVNAV status and map the applicable 20% or 40% WLA resilience benchmark against the existing 15% or 30% MMFR minimum.
• MMF managers should update liquidity-risk policies, escalation thresholds, management information and governance records to evidence enhanced vigilance when WLA approaches or falls below the relevant benchmark.
• Risk teams should incorporate the 20% and 40% benchmarks into Article 28 MMFR stress-testing and assess whether investor concentration, redemption behaviour, market liquidity and portfolio composition require liquidity materially above the benchmark.
• Firms should establish controls to identify periods exceeding 10 business days below the applicable benchmark and procedures for timely CSSF notification, including documented explanations, justifications and any relevant Article 28(4) or (5) remedial measures.
• Boards and senior management should review whether the three-month implementation period announced by CSSF requires changes to investment guidelines, liquidity buffers, breach escalation and reporting calendars.
• Compliance teams may wish to document that the resilience benchmarks are supervisory reference points rather than replacements for the MMFR statutory ratios, while recognising the CSSF’s stated intention to increase supervisory engagement for prolonged deviations.
• Firms should monitor cross-border consistency with the parallel supervisory approaches of the French AMF and Central Bank of Ireland, particularly where groups manage MMFs in multiple EU jurisdictions.

What changed

The CSSF has finalised guidance, following the consultation that closed on 3 August 2026, with only slight clarifications. MMF managers are expected to incorporate 20% WLA for VNAV MMFs and 40% WLA for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs into liquidity-risk frameworks and Article 28 stress-testing processes. These benchmarks sit above the existing Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 minimum WLA requirements of 15% for VNAV MMFs and 30% for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs.

Key dates

2026-05-11

The European Commission published its MMF adequacy report identifying market-resilience WLA benchmarks of 20% for VNAV MMFs and 40% for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs, compared with MMFR minima of 15% and 30%, respectively.

2026-06-08

The CSSF launched its consultation on guidance for MMF weekly liquid asset levels.

2026-08-03 Deadline

Deadline for stakeholders to submit responses to the CSSF consultation.

2026-10-30

The CSSF published the final guidance and feedback statement and began a three-month implementation period.

2027-01-30 Deadline

Expected end of the CSSF's three-month implementation period, calculated from publication on 30 October 2026.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should identify each in-scope MMF's applicable WLA benchmark, distinguishing VNAV funds from public debt CNAV and LVNAV funds, and document the classification rationale.
• Managers should review daily liquidity, weekly liquidity, portfolio composition and liquidity-buffer targets against both the binding MMFR minima and the higher CSSF market-resilience benchmarks.
• Risk teams should enhance monitoring and escalation procedures for WLA levels approaching or falling below 20% or 40%, including ownership, management-information frequency, escalation thresholds and evidence of reinforced decision-making.
• Managers should update MMFR Article 28 stress-testing methodologies and governance to reflect the 20% VNAV and 40% public debt CNAV/LVNAV resilience levels, while retaining the existing MMFR regulatory minima and applicable ESMA stress-test requirements.
• Firms should establish a documented process for counting consecutive business days below the applicable benchmark and for notifying the CSSF after more than 10 business days or when a prolonged or substantial deviation is expected.
• Where stress testing identifies vulnerability, compliance and risk functions should assess whether Article 28(4) immediate notification, Article 28(5) reporting and an action plan are required.
• Managers should prepare records explaining any sustained deviation, including investor-liability characteristics, redemption patterns, liquidity-risk-system outputs, stress-test results and remedial measures, because the CSSF may increase supervisory scrutiny and review available information.
• Firms should assess whether prospectus disclosures, internal liquidity-risk policies, investment guidelines, delegation arrangements and board or conducting-officer reporting need updating during the three-month implementation period.

What changed

The final guidance follows the CSSF consultation launched on 8 June 2026 and contains only slight clarifications after stakeholder feedback. MMF managers are expected to treat 20% WLA for VNAV funds and 40% WLA for public debt CNAV and LVNAV funds as market-resilience reference levels within their liquidity-risk-management and stress-testing frameworks. When WLA approaches or falls below the applicable level, managers should apply enhanced vigilance, timely escalation and reinforced internal decision-making.

Key dates

2026-08-03 Deadline

Deadline for stakeholders to submit responses to the CSSF consultation on the proposed MMF WLA guidance.

2026-10-30

CSSF published the final MMF WLA guidance, feedback statement and consultation responses, including ALFI’s response.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should classify each in-scope MMF as VNAV, public debt CNAV or LVNAV and map the applicable 20% or 40% WLA resilience benchmark against the fund’s existing 15% or 30% MMFR minimum.
• MMF managers should review liquidity risk-management frameworks, redemption assumptions, escalation thresholds, governance documentation and management-information reporting to demonstrate how the relevant benchmark is considered as a risk-management reference point rather than treated automatically as a statutory minimum.
• Managers should incorporate the 20% and 40% benchmarks into Article 28 MMFR stress-testing methodology, scenario analysis and board or governing-body reporting, while documenting fund-specific reasons for maintaining lower or higher WLA levels where appropriate.
• Firms should establish reliable daily monitoring of WLA, a process for identifying periods exceeding 10 business days below the relevant benchmark, and controls for escalating prolonged or substantial deviations to senior management and the CSSF.
• Compliance teams may wish to prepare the information expected in a CSSF notification, including the duration and magnitude of the deviation, its cause, investor and redemption characteristics, stress-test results, liquidity-management actions and the rationale for the manager’s response.
• Boards and depositaries should review whether oversight records, challenge processes and valuation or liquidity controls adequately address the potential supervisory consequences of persistent benchmark breaches.
• Firms should assess the interaction with Circular CSSF 26/911 and the 2025 ESMA MMF stress-test guidelines, which apply to CSSF-supervised MMFs and Luxembourg managers from the 30 June 2026 reporting date onward.
• Managers should avoid presenting the resilience benchmarks to investors as amended legal minimums unless the fund’s governing documents, disclosures or risk limits separately require that treatment; market commentary from respondents indicated concern that the 10-business-day trigger could operate as a de facto limit in practice.

What changed

The final guidance retains the European Commission’s market-resilience WLA benchmarks: 20% for VNAV MMFs and 40% for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs. These levels sit above the Money Market Funds Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/1131) minimum WLA requirements of 15% for VNAV MMFs and 30% for public debt CNAV and LVNAV MMFs; the existing daily liquid asset minimums remain 7.5% and 10%, respectively.

Key dates

2026-06-08

CSSF consultation on proposed guidance was published.

2026-08-03 Deadline

Deadline for stakeholder responses to the consultation.

2026-10-30

CSSF published the final guidance and confirmed a three-month implementation period.

2027-01-30 Deadline

End of the three-month implementation period calculated from publication of the final guidance; affected firms should have implemented the guidance by this date.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should identify each affected MMF's classification under Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 and map its current WLA and DLA monitoring against both the binding MMFR minima and the applicable 20% or 40% market-resilience benchmark.
• Compliance and risk teams may wish to update liquidity-risk policies, escalation thresholds, governance papers and management information to address enhanced vigilance when WLA approaches or falls below the benchmark.
• Managers should incorporate the 20% VNAV and 40% PD CNAV/LVNAV levels into Article 28 MMFR stress-testing methodology, scenarios, documentation and vulnerability-remediation processes.
• Firms should establish controls to identify a breach lasting more than 10 business days and to prepare timely CSSF notifications containing the causes, expected duration, justification and relevant Article 28(4) and (5) measures.
• Boards, conducting officers and relevant risk committees may wish to review whether internal decision-making and escalation procedures are sufficiently reinforced for prolonged or substantial deviations.
• Firms should distinguish clearly in investor, regulatory and internal reporting between binding MMFR liquidity minima and the CSSF's supervisory market-resilience benchmarks, since the latter are not new statutory minimum ratios.
• Luxembourg MMF managers should assess operational readiness during the three-month implementation period and retain evidence of implementation, monitoring and supervisory communications.

What changed

The final guidance largely confirms the consultation proposal and introduces only slight clarifications. MMF managers should incorporate market-resilience WLA levels of 20% for VNAV MMFs and 40% for PD CNAV and LVNAV MMFs into liquidity-risk management and Article 28 MMFR stress-testing processes. These levels operate as supervisory and risk-management benchmarks above the MMFR minimum WLA ratios of 15% for VNAV MMFs and 30% for PD CNAV and LVNAV MMFs; the minimum daily liquid asset ratios remain 7.5% for VNAV MMFs and 10% for PD CNAV and LVNAV MMFs.

Key dates

2026-12-07 Deadline

First phased requirements apply to investment firms and their clients for allocations and confirmations, including electronic, standardised, international-standard and machine-readable communications except during temporary technical disruptions.

2027-07-01 Deadline

Second phased implementation deadline under the amended settlement-discipline framework.

2027-10-11 Deadline

EU securities markets move from the standard T+2 settlement cycle to T+1; the final phased settlement-discipline requirements apply.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should map every allocation, confirmation, matching and settlement-instruction process affected by the amended settlement-discipline RTS and identify manual, non-standardised or non-machine-readable steps.
• Compliance teams may wish to confirm that electronic, standardised communication channels and international messaging standards are available to the firm and its professional clients before 7 December 2026.
• Firms should consider implementing trade-date controls, internal cut-offs, automated alerts, escalation procedures and exception reporting to identify transactions at risk of missing the applicable allocation and confirmation deadline.
• Investment firms may wish to review client onboarding and contractual documentation to ensure that professional clients provide complete settlement details and use compatible communication channels and formats.
• Operations and technology teams should test end-to-end connectivity, message formats, reference data, settlement instructions, matching, foreign-exchange funding, securities lending, collateral and asset-servicing workflows across the entire trading and settlement ecosystem.
• Firms should assess readiness not only within their own organisation but also across brokers, custodians, clients, fund administrators, CSDs, settlement agents and other outsourced providers.
• Firms should establish a phased implementation plan covering the 7 December 2026, 1 July 2027 and 11 October 2027 milestones, with evidence of testing, issue remediation and management oversight.
• Compliance teams may wish to monitor further ESMA and CSSF supervisory communications because ESMA and national competent authorities have indicated that they will monitor compliance with the new obligations.

What changed

Amended settlement-discipline regulatory technical standards under Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 introduce phased requirements supporting the EU T+1 transition. From 7 December 2026, investment firms and their clients must use electronic, standardised communication channels and international messaging standards for allocations and confirmations, with machine-readable communication required except during temporary technical disruptions.

Key dates

2026-10-21

CSSF published the communiqué warning about CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619; PHP also released security updates addressing the vulnerabilities on this date.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should consider urgently inventorying internet-facing and internally accessible services that run PHP, including PHP embedded in outsourced, cloud-hosted and vendor-managed applications.
• Technology and security teams may wish to determine the installed PHP branch and apply the relevant fixed release, including PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35 where applicable, after validating compatibility and deployment integrity.
• Where immediate patching is not feasible, firms should consider isolating or taking affected internet-facing services offline, placing them behind network-layer authentication or equivalent compensating controls, and restricting PHP execution to required functions.
• Security teams may wish to review web-server, PHP, application, endpoint and identity logs for exploitation indicators, unusual child processes, unexpected outbound connections, persistence and activity associated with unauthenticated requests.
• Firms should consider assessing whether any unauthorised remote code execution, suspected compromise or material service disruption meets the applicable major ICT-related incident criteria and documenting the classification decision.
• DORA entities should consider preparing the notification required under Circular CSSF 25/893 and the applicable DORA implementing rules if the incident is classified as major; the initial notification is generally due within four hours of classification and no later than 24 hours after awareness, followed by an intermediate report within 72 hours and a final report within one month.
• Entities subject to CSSF Circular 24/847 should consider following that circular's notification process for a major ICT-related incident and confirming whether any parallel obligations arise under applicable NIS or sectoral requirements.
• Compliance teams may wish to retain evidence of the affected-asset inventory, patch or mitigation decisions, threat monitoring, incident assessment and communications with relevant ICT third-party providers.

What changed

The publication does not introduce a new standalone rule or compliance deadline; it provides an urgent supervisory warning and links the risk to existing ICT incident-reporting obligations. Until the affected versions were officially confirmed, the CSSF's stated position was that all PHP-powered services should be treated as potentially exposed. Independent security analysis reported that PHP released fixes on 21 October 2026 in versions 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35, with both vulnerabilities rated CVSS 4.0 at 9.2 and capable of execution under the web-worker account.

Key dates

2017-06-30

CSSF originally published the prudential procedure for appointments to the management body and key function-holder roles in credit institutions.

2026-05-05

Luxembourg enacted the Law implementing CRD VI and related EU requirements, including tightened fit-and-proper provisions.

2026-05-06

The Law of 5 May 2026 was published in Memorial A n° 227 and its directly amended provisions became relevant from entry into force.

2026-10-15

CSSF updated the procedure publication and the related management-body and key-function-holder fit-and-proper declaration forms; the procedure is marked as being updated.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should compare their current appointment and fit-and-proper processes with the refreshed CSSF declaration forms and identify changes to information, attestations and supporting evidence.
• Compliance teams may wish to map each management-body and key-function-holder appointment to the applicable CSSF, ECB or IMAS Portal submission route, including whether the entity is significant or less significant.
• Firms should consider building a minimum 30-working-day pre-appointment submission period into planning for appointments covered by the CRD VI and Luxembourg implementation requirements, subject to confirmation in the final CSSF procedure.
• Institutions should refresh internal suitability assessments to address reputation, knowledge, skills and experience, time commitment, independence, conflicts of interest, diversity and collective suitability, and should retain evidence of the board’s assessment.
• Firms should review role descriptions, responsibility maps, reporting lines and individual statements for management-body members, senior management and key function holders, as these are identified in market commentary as areas reinforced by the CRD VI implementation framework.
• Existing appointees should be included in periodic or event-driven reassessment processes so that continuing suitability and the institution’s ability to notify material changes can be demonstrated.
• Firms should monitor the forthcoming amended EBA internal-governance guidelines and subsequent CSSF revision of Circular 12/552 and the prudential procedure before finalising policy changes.

What changed

The CSSF has refreshed the prudential-procedure publication and four related declaration templates: appointee and institution declarations for management-body members and key function holders. The page does not disclose the substantive text of the revised procedure, so it does not establish a new standalone deadline or approval requirement by itself.

Key dates

2026-02-09

AMLA opened the public consultation on the draft RTS concerning business relationships, occasional and linked transactions, lower thresholds, and customer due diligence.

2026-04-16

AMLA opened the public consultation on the draft RTS concerning group-wide requirements and additional measures for subsidiaries and branches in third countries.

2026-05-08

Public consultation closed for the business-relationship, transaction and customer-due-diligence draft RTS.

2026-06-15

Public consultation closed for the group-wide arrangements and third-country legal-impediment draft RTS.

2026-10-01

AMLA announced that it had finalised the three draft RTS and submitted them to the European Commission for formal adoption.

2026-10-07

CSSF published its communiqué drawing Luxembourg professionals’ attention to the draft RTS and recommending preparatory gap analysis and control work.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to complete a gap analysis against the AMLA final reports, particularly for customer and beneficial-owner information, verification sources, electronic identification, non-face-to-face onboarding and PEP screening.
• Firms should consider mapping current customer journeys and transaction-monitoring logic to the proposed distinction between business relationships, occasional transactions and linked transactions.
• Firms may wish to identify products, sectors and transaction types that could be affected by lower CDD thresholds for higher-risk activities, while avoiding reliance on unfinalised monetary thresholds.
• Financial groups should consider reviewing group-wide AML/CFT governance, risk assessments, policies, internal controls, training and secure information-sharing arrangements, including structures involving common ownership, management, compliance control, networks or partnerships.
• Groups with branches or subsidiaries in third countries should consider inventorying legal impediments to applying EU AMLR and group policies and preparing escalation, risk-mitigation and supervisory-response procedures.
• IT and operations teams may wish to assess changes needed for customer-data fields, linked-transaction detection, identity-verification evidence, electronic identification and intra-group information exchange.
• Firms should monitor the European Commission’s adoption process and the Official Journal publication because the final text, effective date and any amendments remain unknown; preparatory work should be calibrated to the proposed six-month transition period rather than treated as a current binding deadline.

What changed

The draft RTS under Article 19(9) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 would establish criteria for distinguishing business relationships, occasional transactions and linked transactions, and would identify high-risk obliged entities, sectors or transactions for which lower CDD thresholds should apply. The draft RTS under Article 28(1) would specify information and verification requirements for standard, simplified and enhanced CDD, including reliable and independent verification sources, electronic identification means, qualified trust services, non-face-to-face verification, and relevant treatment...

Key dates

2024-09-18

The CSSF began the on-site inspection of the manager’s corporate governance framework.

2024-10-10

The CSSF completed the on-site inspection that identified persistent internal-governance and delegation-oversight deficiencies.

2026-07-09

The CSSF imposed the total administrative fine of EUR 71,500.

2026-10-05

The CSSF published the sanction decision anonymously.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to map every delegated portfolio manager to a documented, risk-based periodic due-diligence plan and verify that reviews are renewed at an appropriate frequency under the manager’s risk matrix.
• Firms should consider documenting assessments of each delegate’s legal and contractual compliance, control environment, best-execution procedures, broker-selection processes and relevant reporting capabilities.
• Firms should consider testing whether delegate oversight includes independent verification rather than relying exclusively on confirmations, questionnaires or representations from portfolio managers.
• Management companies may wish to establish measurable monitoring indicators, thresholds, exception escalation and evidence-retention arrangements for best-execution oversight, consistently with the applicable delegation procedures and CSSF Circular 18/698.
• Firms should consider reviewing delegation contracts, governance reporting and action plans to demonstrate that the supervisory framework protects the interests of the funds and investors and that monitoring of delegated activities remains with the manager.
• Compliance teams may wish to benchmark their controls against the CSSF’s broader thematic and enforcement messaging; independent commentary indicates that inadequate delegate supervision, weak quantitative monitoring and insufficient evidence of independent controls are recurring supervisory concerns.

What changed

This is an enforcement action rather than a new rule. The CSSF applied Article 110(1)(b) and (f), and Articles 148(2)(j) and 148(4)(e), of the amended Law of 17 December 2010 relating to undertakings for collective investment, together with Article 18(1)(e) and (f), and Article 51(1) and (2), of the amended Law of 12 July 2013 on alternative investment fund managers. The fine comprised EUR 47,320 under the 2010 Law and EUR 24,180 under the AIFM Law.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA became applicable to financial entities within the CSSF supervisory perimeter.

2025-12-17

The European Commission confirmed through DORA Q&A DORA102-3097 that DORA applies to qualifying third-country branches in an EU country.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and its amendments took effect immediately.

2027-02-27 Deadline

The six-month transition period for PSPs not otherwise subject to DORA under Circular CSSF 25/893 is expected to end; the DORA incident-reporting framework then applies to those PSPs and Circular CSSF 21/787 is repealed for them.

2027-03-31 Deadline

Latest date in the annual CSSF register-of-information submission window for arrangements contracted during 2026, subject to the applicable CSSF collection process.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should map each Luxembourg third-country branch against the DORA Article 2(1)(a) to (t) categories as the undertaking would be classified in the third country, documenting the legal-entity and regulatory-status analysis.
• Compliance teams may wish to update the branch's regulatory inventory, DORA applicability assessment, governance documentation and responsibility matrices to reflect immediate inclusion where the qualifying test is met.
• Affected branches should review ICT third-party-service contracts, the register of information and planned arrangements supporting critical or important functions, including whether CSSF notification was made at least three months before implementation or one month where the specified Luxembourg support-PFS exception applies.
• Firms should distinguish ICT outsourcing from other outsourcing: ICT outsourcing should be managed under the DORA framework and Circular CSSF 25/882, while non-ICT outsourcing remains subject to Circular CSSF 22/806 Part I.
• Incident-response teams should test the CSSF eDesk Portal and S3 API reporting channels and maintain a contingency process for notifying [email protected] by the applicable deadline if technical failure prevents use of the primary channel.
• Firms should confirm that major ICT incidents are reported individually and that outsourced reporting arrangements preserve the firm's responsibility for timing, completeness and notification content.
• Affected branches should assess whether they are microenterprises under DORA Article 3(60), since Circular CSSF 25/892 excludes microenterprises from its aggregated-cost estimation framework, except for trading venues, central counterparties, trade repositories and central securities depositories.
• Where the branch is an EU branch rather than a third-country branch, firms should verify the home-Member-State allocation rules because the CSSF circulars generally exclude EU branches from the relevant Luxembourg reporting chapters.

What changed

The circular implements the European Commission's 17 December 2025 DORA Q&A position and includes qualifying third-country branches in the scope of Circulars CSSF 25/882 on ICT third-party services, 25/892 on aggregated annual costs and losses from major ICT incidents, and 25/893 on major ICT-related incident and significant cyber-threat reporting.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA began applying to in-scope financial entities supervised by the CSSF.

2025-12-17

The European Commission confirmed through DORA Q&A 102 that DORA applies to qualifying third-country branches in an EU Member State.

2026-06-30 Deadline

CSSF’s extended best-efforts deadline for the first register-of-information submission by third-country branches of credit institutions headquartered in a third country.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and took effect immediately; the listed CSSF circulars were amended to include or remove qualifying third-country branches as applicable.

2027-03-31 Deadline

Target date identified by CSSF for the required-quality register-of-information submission by third-country branches of credit institutions headquartered in a third country.

2027-01-11

Relevant CRD VI third-country-branch provisions are scheduled to take effect, subject to national transposition and applicable transitional rules.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should map each Luxembourg third-country branch against the counterfactual test in Circular 26/915: whether the head-office undertaking would qualify under Article 2(1)(a) to (t) of DORA if established in the relevant third country.
• Affected branches should update their regulatory-perimeter inventories, governance documents, ICT-risk policies, outsourcing inventories, incident-classification procedures and DORA control testing to reflect immediate inclusion in the DORA-specific CSSF circulars.
• Compliance teams may wish to separate non-ICT outsourcing, which remains subject to Part I of Circular CSSF 22/806, from ICT outsourcing, which is governed by DORA and Circular CSSF 25/882 rather than the legacy Part II framework.
• Affected entities should validate their register-of-information process under DORA and Circular CSSF 25/882, including branch-level data, ICT third-party contracts, intra-group arrangements and submission ownership. The 30 June 2026 best-efforts deadline for third-country branches of credit institutions has passed, and firms should prepare for the 31 March 2027 collection and any CSSF remediation requests.
• Incident-response teams should test access to the CSSF eDesk procedure and S3 API and document an escalation process for emailing [email protected] when technical impossibility prevents electronic submission.
• Firms should assess whether they qualify for the microenterprise exclusion in Circular CSSF 25/892; the exclusion applies to entities employing fewer than 10 persons with annual turnover and/or annual balance-sheet total not exceeding EUR 2 million, subject to the DORA definition and exclusions for specified market infrastructures.
• Third-country banking groups should coordinate DORA implementation with the CRD VI third-country-branch analysis, including the 11 January 2027 effective date for relevant CRD VI provisions, rather than assuming that the two regimes have identical scope or timing.

What changed

Qualifying third-country branches are added to the scope of Circulars CSSF 25/882, 25/892 and 25/893, covering DORA ICT third-party-service information and reporting, estimation of aggregated annual costs and losses from major ICT-related incidents under Article 11(11) of DORA and the Joint ESA Guidelines JC/GL/2024/34, and reporting of major ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA became applicable to financial entities within its scope, subject to the specific DORA provisions and technical standards applicable to each entity.

2025-04-09

Circular CSSF 25/881 was published and took effect, removing DORA financial entities from Circular 20/750 and retaining 20/750 for entities outside DORA; PSP-specific provisions were reorganised under Circular 25/880.

2026-06-30 Deadline

CSSF extended the first Register of Information submission for Luxembourg branches of third-country credit institutions to this date on a best-efforts basis; the CSSF indicated that the required level of quality should be achieved for the 2027 submission.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published, confirming the DORA treatment of qualifying third-country branches and removing them from the full scope of Circular 20/750 and related overlapping circular provisions.

2027-03-31 Deadline

Target date identified by the CSSF for the required-quality Register of Information submission by Luxembourg branches of third-country credit institutions.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should classify each Luxembourg entity and branch against DORA Article 2 and the amended scope of Circular 20/750, including an assessment of whether a third-country head office would qualify under DORA Article 2(1)(a) to (t).
• Compliance teams may wish to determine whether the entity should operate under DORA rather than 20/750, and document the rationale, legal-entity perimeter and treatment of any Luxembourg branch.
• Firms remaining within Circular 20/750 should consider reviewing their ICT and security-risk-management framework, governance approvals, risk assessments, incident processes, business-continuity arrangements and control testing against the continuing requirements.
• Payment service providers should consider replacing references to the PSP provisions formerly contained in Circular 20/750 with the applicable requirements in Circular CSSF 25/880 and EBA/GL/2025/02.
• Third-country branches treated as DORA entities should consider validating their DORA governance, ICT-risk framework, incident-reporting arrangements, ICT contractual inventory and Register of Information processes, taking account of CSSF reporting communications.
• Firms should update policies, regulatory inventories, outsourcing and ICT-third-party registers, training materials and regulatory mapping to distinguish DORA obligations from the residual Circular 20/750 obligations.
• Compliance teams may wish to retain evidence of the scope assessment and implementation date, because the 2025 amendment was effective immediately and the 2026 amendment changes the treatment of a previously identified 20/750 population.

What changed

Circular 25/881 provides that DORA financial entities supervised by the CSSF no longer fall within Circular 20/750; for entities covered by 20/750 but outside DORA, the circular continues to apply in full. Payment-service-provider-specific ICT and security-risk provisions were removed from 20/750 and regrouped in Circular CSSF 25/880, reflecting the revised EBA Guidelines on ICT and security risk management for payment service providers, including EBA/GL/2025/02.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA became applicable to in-scope financial entities, according to the CSSF implementation communication referenced by Circular CSSF 25/882.

2025-04-09

Circular CSSF 25/882 was published and applied with immediate effect.

2025-04-01 Deadline

The first exceptional CSSF register submission window opened for arrangements contracted up to 31 March 2025.

2025-04-15 Deadline

The first exceptional CSSF register submission window closed.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and immediately amended Circular CSSF 25/882 to include qualifying third-country branches in Luxembourg.

2027-03-31 Deadline

Latest date for submission of the register covering arrangements contracted through the end of 2026, under the recurring annual window running from 28 February to 31 March of the following year.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should assess whether Luxembourg third-country branches now fall within the amended scope by comparing the branch’s undertaking and head-office activities with the DORA categories in Article 2(1)(a) to (t) and documenting the conclusion.
• Compliance teams may wish to inventory all ICT third-party arrangements, including digital, data, cloud, infrastructure and operational services that may not qualify as outsourcing under prior CSSF terminology.
• Firms should consider updating ICT third-party approval workflows so arrangements supporting critical or important functions are notified through the CSSF-prescribed form at least three months before commencement, or one month before commencement where the provider is an eligible Luxembourg support PFS.
• Firms should maintain an accurate register of information at individual, sub-consolidated and consolidated levels, with controls for prompt correction when requested by the CSSF and the ability to provide the register outside the annual submission window.
• Compliance and outsourcing teams may wish to reassess contractual access to professional-secrecy data against Article 41(2a) LFS or Article 30(2a) LPS and verify that Luxembourg ICT management or operations providers hold the required Article 29-3 LFS authorisation or qualify for an applicable exception.
• Firms using cloud services should confirm that the resource operator has designated a suitably qualified cloud officer and that internal cloud, information-security and third-party oversight responsibilities are clearly allocated.
• Third-country branches should consider implementing the requirements immediately because Circular CSSF 26/915 provides no transition period, while preserving evidence of governance, notification and register controls for supervisory review.

What changed

Circular CSSF 26/915 includes in Circular CSSF 25/882’s scope all Luxembourg third-country branches of undertakings covered by the specified DORA financial-entity categories where the head office would qualify as a DORA entity under Article 2(1)(a) to (t) in the relevant third country. The requirements apply to ICT services broadly, not only arrangements that meet a traditional outsourcing definition.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA began applying to financial entities within its scope, subject to the relevant provisions and transitional arrangements.

2025-04-09

Circular CSSF 25/883 was published and applied with immediate effect, amending Circular CSSF 22/806 and introducing the DORA-based division between ICT and business-process outsourcing.

2025-12-17

The European Commission confirmed through a DORA Q&A that DORA applies to qualifying third-country branches in an EU Member State.

2026-06-30 Deadline

CSSF-extended submission date for the 2026 DORA register of information for third-country branches of credit institutions headquartered in a third country; entities were invited to submit on a best-efforts basis.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and applied with immediate effect, confirming the DORA treatment of qualifying Luxembourg third-country branches and updating Circular CSSF 22/806 accordingly.

2027-03-31 Deadline

Target CSSF submission deadline for the DORA register of information for affected third-country branches following the initial 2026 collection.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should classify each outsourcing arrangement as ICT or non-ICT and determine whether the entity and arrangement fall within DORA, Circular 22/806, or both regimes in their respective areas of application.
• DORA entities should consider moving ICT arrangements from their Circular 22/806 outsourcing inventory and controls into the DORA ICT third-party register, while retaining Circular 22/806 controls for business-process outsourcing.
• Non-DORA entities should consider continuing to apply the full Circular 22/806 framework to ICT and business-process outsourcing, including due diligence, governance, critical-or-important assessments, monitoring, sub-outsourcing and exit planning.
• Third-country branches should assess whether their head office would qualify under Article 2(1)(a) to (t) of DORA and, if so, align ICT governance, contractual arrangements, registers and reporting with DORA rather than relying solely on Circular 22/806.
• Compliance teams may wish to review cloud contracts and avoid carrying forward legacy EEA governing-law or hosting clauses where DORA now provides the applicable framework, while preserving enforceable audit, access, cooperation, security, business-continuity and exit rights.
• Firms should use the revised CSSF notification form for new critical or important ICT outsourcing arrangements and preserve evidence supporting the three-month notification period, or the one-month period for arrangements involving a support PSF.
• Firms should consider validating that existing ICT outsourcing notifications remain complete under the applicable DORA register-of-information requirements, even though Circular 25/883 does not require their re-submission.
• Affected third-country branches should consider submitting and maintaining the DORA register of information through the CSSF process, with the 2027 collection requiring data quality suitable for the 31 March 2027 submission deadline.

What changed

From 9 April 2025, DORA entities generally no longer apply the ICT-outsourcing provisions of Circular CSSF 22/806 to ICT arrangements; those arrangements are governed by DORA, including its ICT third-party risk-management, contractual, register-of-information and oversight requirements, together with Circular CSSF 25/882. Circular 22/806 continues to apply to business-process outsourcing by DORA entities, and continues to apply in full to non-DORA entities, including their ICT outsourcing. Chapter 16 management companies remain subject to Circular 22/806 for ICT outsourcing.

Key dates

2025-05-19

The Joint ESA Guidelines JC/GL/2024/34 apply at ESA level.

2025-05-31

Circular CSSF 25/892 applies to its original in-scope Luxembourg entities, excluding DORA microenterprises.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 is issued and applies with immediate effect, bringing qualifying Luxembourg third-country branches into the scope of Circular CSSF 25/892.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to determine whether each Luxembourg entity or third-country branch falls within the amended scope, including whether a third-country head-office undertaking would qualify under DORA Article 2(1)(a) to (t).
• Firms should consider documenting their microenterprise analysis against DORA Article 3(60), including the fewer-than-10-employees and EUR 2 million annual turnover and/or balance-sheet-total thresholds, while noting that the DORA definition excludes trading venues, central counterparties, trade repositories and central securities depositories from the microenterprise exemption.
• Firms should consider maintaining an incident-level ledger linking major ICT-related incidents, DORA final-report reference codes, gross costs, losses, provisions, recoveries and subsequent adjustments.
• Finance, operational-risk and ICT-incident teams may wish to agree whether the firm will use a completed calendar year or completed accounting year as its reference basis and establish controls to apply that basis consistently.
• Firms should consider reconciling estimates to financial-statement or supervisory-reporting data where available, while retaining documented estimation methodology and assumptions where accurate data is unavailable.
• Firms should consider tracking quantifiable financial impacts from prior-year major incidents because those impacts may need to be included in a later reference year without reopening the original final incident report.
• Third-country branches may wish to confirm reporting ownership and data availability with their head office, because the amended CSSF scope is at branch level but the required cost and loss information may arise across the undertaking.
• Compliance teams may wish to monitor CSSF communications for a specific request, reporting channel and submission deadline; the circular itself establishes an upon-request obligation rather than a fixed automatic annual filing deadline.

What changed

From 2025-05-31, in-scope Luxembourg financial entities other than DORA microenterprises must be able, upon CSSF request, to provide an entity-level estimate of aggregated annual costs and losses arising from major ICT-related incidents. The estimate must use the ESA common template and identify each relevant incident by the same reference code used in its DORA final incident report.

Key dates

2025-01-17

DORA provisions became applicable to financial entities in scope and supervised by the CSSF.

2025-05-28

Circular CSSF 25/893 was published and established the Luxembourg DORA incident and significant cyber-threat reporting modalities.

2025-11-28 Deadline

End of the six-month transition period granted to payment service providers outside DORA for implementation of the Circular 25/893 framework.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and the 25/893 page was updated to clarify DORA applicability to qualifying third-country branches in Luxembourg; the amendment applies immediately.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to confirm the entity-by-entity scope analysis against DORA Article 2, including whether a Luxembourg third-country branch is covered following the 27 August 2026 clarification.
• Firms should consider documenting incident-classification criteria and decision records against Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772, including the quantitative thresholds for clients, transactions, duration, geographical spread, data loss, economic impact and reputational impact.
• Firms should consider testing an escalation timetable that supports classification, initial notification within four hours and no later than 24 hours after awareness, the 72-hour intermediate report and the one-month final report.
• PSPs outside DORA may wish to update policies so that all ICT-related incidents, rather than only payment-service incidents, are assessed under the DORA framework and to verify that the six-month transition requirements were completed by 28 November 2025.
• Firms should consider ensuring that eDesk access, authorised users, templates, internal approvals and S3 API connectivity are operational before an incident occurs.
• Incident-response procedures may wish to prohibit aggregation of separate major incidents where the CSSF reporting process requires event-specific submissions and should assign ownership even where reporting support is outsourced.
• Third-country branches may wish to align their Luxembourg reporting playbooks, head-office escalation arrangements and local CSSF contacts with the immediate-effect scope clarification.
• Firms should consider retaining evidence of classification, notification times, report versions, management approvals and communications with ICT third parties to demonstrate timely compliance.

What changed

DORA financial entities supervised by the CSSF must classify ICT-related incidents using the criteria and thresholds in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 and report each major ICT-related incident using the DORA reporting templates and procedures. Reporting is phased: an initial notification is generally due within four hours after classification as major and in any event no later than 24 hours after the entity becomes aware of the incident; an intermediate report is generally due within 72 hours after the initial notification; and a final report is generally due within one month...

Key dates

2022-04-22

Circular CSSF 22/806 was published and replaced or amended specified earlier CSSF and IML outsourcing, governance and control circulars.

2022-06-30

Circular CSSF 22/806 became applicable according to the CSSF implementation framework.

2025-01-17

DORA Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 became applicable to in-scope financial entities, creating the primary EU framework for ICT third-party risk management.

2025-04-09

Circular CSSF 25/883 was published; the amended Circular 22/806 applies to outsourcing arrangements entered into, reviewed or amended on or after this date.

2025-12-17

The European Commission confirmed that DORA also applies to qualifying third-country branches in an EU Member State where the third-country head-office entity would fall within DORA Article 2(1)(a) to (t).

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and the CSSF webpage consolidated the amended version of Circular 22/806, confirming the DORA treatment of qualifying Luxembourg third-country branches.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should map each outsourcing and third-party technology arrangement against the applicable regime: DORA, Circular 22/806 business-process outsourcing requirements, or the full Circular 22/806 framework for non-DORA entities.
• Compliance teams may wish to review whether Luxembourg third-country branches have a head-office activity that corresponds to a DORA Article 2(1)(a) to (t) financial entity and document the resulting DORA scope assessment.
• Firms should update outsourcing policies, risk assessments, governance approvals, materiality or criticality assessments, due-diligence files, monitoring controls and exit strategies to reflect the split between DORA ICT third-party risk management and Circular 22/806 business-process outsourcing.
• Firms should maintain or update the DORA register of information for ICT third-party arrangements where DORA applies, and reconcile it with the outsourcing inventory and CSSF notification processes.
• Firms should review legacy cloud contracts and remove reliance on the repealed Circular 22/806 EEA-law and EEA-resilience clauses where DORA is the applicable ICT third-party regime, while retaining contract terms needed to satisfy DORA and any applicable national requirements.
• Non-DORA entities should consider whether their existing contracts still address Circular 22/806 requirements for access and audit rights, sub-outsourcing, confidentiality, data location, business continuity, termination and exit.
• Management companies authorised solely under Article 125-1 should consider retaining the full Circular 22/806 control framework for ICT outsourcing rather than assuming that DORA displaces it.
• Firms should assess whether outsourcing arrangements entered into, reviewed or amended from 9 April 2025 require remediation or re-papering under the amended framework.

What changed

Circular 25/883 amended Circular 22/806 following DORA Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 becoming applicable on 17 January 2025. For entities subject to DORA, the ICT-outsourcing provisions of Circular 22/806 were largely repealed or displaced by DORA's ICT third-party risk-management requirements, while Circular 22/806 remains applicable to business-process outsourcing.

Key dates

2020-08-25

Circular CSSF 20/750 was originally published, establishing CSSF expectations for ICT and security risk management.

2025-01-17

Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector became applicable to DORA-defined financial entities supervised by the CSSF.

2025-04-09

Circular CSSF 25/881 amended Circular 20/750, narrowing it primarily to non-DORA entities and moving PSP-specific requirements to Circular CSSF 25/880.

2026-08-27

Circular CSSF 26/915 was published and applies with immediate effect; DORA-equivalent third-country branches are removed from Circular 20/750 and addressed through the DORA-related CSSF framework.

Suggested considerations

• Firms with Luxembourg third-country branches should document an entity-by-entity DORA scoping analysis, including the classification of the non-EU head-office undertaking under Article 2(1)(a) to (t) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and the relevance of Article 2(2).
• Affected branches should consider retiring Circular 20/750 as their primary ICT framework and mapping controls instead to DORA and the applicable CSSF circulars, including Circular CSSF 25/882 on ICT third-party services and Circular CSSF 25/893 on major ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats.
• Firms should review ICT third-party inventories, contracts, due diligence files, exit strategies and, where relevant, the DORA Register of Information so that all ICT services are captured regardless of whether the arrangement is formally classified as outsourcing.
• Entities remaining within Circular 20/750 should consider confirming that the management body has approved the ICT and security risk-management framework and that it is reviewed at least annually.
• Remaining in-scope entities should consider refreshing their annual ICT and security risk assessment, critical-function and information-asset mapping, threat and vulnerability monitoring, access controls, patching, backup, recovery, incident-response and business-continuity documentation.
• Compliance teams may wish to verify that critical ICT systems undergo security testing at least annually, non-critical systems are tested regularly and at least every three years, and critical business continuity arrangements are tested at least annually.
• Branches and PSP-related entities should consider validating incident-reporting channels and escalation procedures, including the CSSF alternative email channel for exceptional technical failures where the prescribed DORA reporting channel cannot be used.
• Firms should consider preserving evidence of proportionality assessments, control testing, audit findings, remediation, management-body reporting and staff security training for CSSF supervisory review.

What changed

Circular 26/915 applies with immediate effect and removes DORA-equivalent third-country branches from the scope of Circular 20/750. A third-country branch is treated as DORA-relevant where, in the jurisdiction of its head office, the undertaking would qualify as an entity listed in Article 2(1)(a) to (t) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, subject to the applicable exclusions and Article 2(2) conditions.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF published the administrative sanction imposed on BigRep SE.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should confirm whether each Luxembourg-home-State issuer in scope has published its annual financial report no later than four months after the end of the financial year under Article 3 of the Transparency Law.
• Firms should verify that half-yearly financial reports are published no later than three months after the end of the first six months of the financial year under Article 4 of the Transparency Law.
• Compliance teams may wish to test evidence of effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage with the Officially Appointed Mechanism for each periodic report.
• Issuer boards and senior management may wish to review escalation procedures for missed reporting deadlines and CSSF orders, including documented ownership, contingency arrangements and prompt remediation.
• Firms should consider maintaining an auditable reporting calendar that captures statutory deadlines, CSSF correspondence, publication timestamps, CSSF filings and Officially Appointed Mechanism confirmations.
• Issuers subject to a CSSF order should consider treating the order as a separately tracked remediation obligation rather than relying solely on completion of the underlying publication.

What changed

The CSSF imposed an administrative sanction on BigRep SE under the amended Luxembourg law of 11 January 2008 on transparency requirements for issuers. The decision concerns BigRep SE's failure to comply with the applicable requirement to publish periodic financial information and with related obligations concerning effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage through the Officially Appointed Mechanism. The sanction is an enforcement action against a specific issuer rather than a new rule or general regulatory amendment.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF publication of the administrative sanction against Corestate Capital Holding S.A.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams of Luxembourg-home-State issuers should obtain and review both PDFs linked to the CSSF publication to confirm the sanction amount, affected report, breached provision, reasoning and any required remediation.
• Issuers should consider testing their annual and half-yearly financial-reporting calendars against the applicable deadlines in Articles 3 and 4 of the Transparency Law, including controls for effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage through the Officially Appointed Mechanism.
• Boards and senior management may wish to document ownership, escalation and evidence-retention arrangements for periodic-reporting deliverables, particularly where audits, restructuring, going-concern issues or delayed financial close could affect publication timing.
• Groups with repeated or historic reporting delays should consider a targeted review of prior CSSF correspondence, compliance with supervisory orders and the completeness of issuer disclosure controls.
• Legal and compliance teams should assess whether any appeal or procedural response is relevant after reviewing the decision; the publication page supplied does not state an appeal period.

What changed

The CSSF imposed an administrative sanction on Corestate Capital Holding S.A. The supplied publication page does not disclose the sanction amount, the precise reporting failure, the legal provision breached, or any remedial order; those details should be taken from the linked PDF decision before relying on them operationally. The publication does not itself introduce a new general obligation: the relevant existing framework is the Luxembourg Transparency Law of 11 January 2008, including its periodic-reporting, dissemination, storage and CSSF-filing requirements where applicable.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF imposed and published the €10,000 administrative fine against Gaz Capital S.A. for non-compliance concerning the annual financial report for the year ended 31 December 2025.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to identify every security for which the firm has Luxembourg as its home Member State and confirm whether any Article 7 exemption applies.
• Issuers with a 31 December financial year-end should consider scheduling publication of the annual financial report no later than 30 April of the following year, subject to the applicable reporting-period and instrument requirements.
• Firms should consider maintaining evidence of timely publication, effective dissemination, submission to the CSSF and storage on the Officially Appointed Mechanism, including timestamps, responsible persons and vendor confirmations.
• Reporting calendars may be reviewed to ensure that audited financial statements, the management report and responsible-person statements are complete and approved sufficiently before the four-month deadline.
• Where a delay is possible, issuers may wish to escalate promptly to senior management, legal counsel and the CSSF and document the cause, remediation and communications plan; the sanction indicates that failure across multiple disclosure channels can be treated as non-compliance even where the underlying report is subsequently produced.
• The issuer may wish to assess whether to challenge the decision before the Tribunal administratif within the statutory three-month period.

What changed

No new regulatory obligation was introduced; this is an enforcement action applying existing requirements. An issuer for which Luxembourg is the home Member State must make its annual financial report public no later than four months after the end of each financial year under Article 3 of the Transparency Law, keep it publicly available for at least 10 years, effectively disseminate it, store it on the Officially Appointed Mechanism and file it with the CSSF.