Enforcement Actions

Key dates

2026-08-27

The OCC issued Bulletin 2026-42 announcing the notice of proposed rulemaking.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to inventory open and recently closed MRAs arising from alleged legal or regulatory violations and assess whether each matter would satisfy one or more of the proposed substantive-violation criteria.
• Firms should consider strengthening documentation linking examination findings to duration, frequency, systemic characteristics, financial-condition effects, books-and-records impacts, customer harm, restitution, or insider misconduct.
• Banks may wish to separate remediation plans for legal or regulatory violations from broader supervisory enhancements, because the proposal would limit examiner authority over technical violations to directing correction of the violation itself.
• Compliance and examination-management teams should consider preparing comments or internal positions on the undefined terms more than minimal, systemic, pattern, and meaningfully impact, including how those terms should be applied to isolated but high-severity events.
• Management may wish to review escalation thresholds so that technical-violation treatment does not result in under-escalation of recurring findings that could become systemic or satisfy the proposed substantive criteria.
• Banks should monitor the Federal Register publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking and calculate the 30-day comment period from that publication date rather than from the OCC bulletin date.
• Legal and regulatory-change teams may wish to assess this proposal alongside the OCC-FDIC final rule and related supervisory reforms concerning unsafe or unsound practices, MRAs, and material financial risk, while treating the proposal as nonfinal until adopted.

What changed

The proposed rule would provide that the OCC may issue an MRA for a violation of a banking or banking-related law or regulation only when the violation is substantive. A violation would be substantive when its nature, duration, frequency, or severity could meaningfully impact the bank or its customers, and at least one of five criteria would need to be met: the violation is systemic or constitutes a pattern; it has had or could reasonably be expected to have a direct, clear, predictable, and more than minimal impact on the bank's financial condition; it has had or could reasonably be expected...

Key dates

2026-08-27

OCC issued revised PPM 5310-3 and PPM 5400-11; PPM 5310-3 replaces the May 25, 2023 manual, PPM 5400-11 replaces the February 27, 2026 version, and OCC Bulletin 2023-16 is rescinded.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to map open MRAs, enforcement orders, capital directives, and supervisory findings against the new material-harm, Deposit Insurance Fund risk, and substantive-violation thresholds.
• Banks should consider reviewing issue-management taxonomies and governance procedures so that MRAs, other violations, and supervisory observations are recorded and escalated according to their distinct consequences.
• Board and committee reporting processes may warrant review because supervisory observations do not automatically require board presentation or a corrective-action plan, whereas MRAs and enforcement actions remain subject to formal remediation and validation expectations.
• Large and complex banks should consider reassessing whether deficiencies that might previously have produced a community-bank-level supervisory response could receive faster escalation under the revised tailoring framework.
• Banks with existing enforcement actions may wish to assess whether their remediation evidence demonstrates substantial compliance with the essential requirements of each order and whether remaining issues are minor and isolated.
• Capital management teams may wish to review procedures for the institution of and termination of individual minimum capital ratios under the revised enforcement manual.
• Legal and regulatory change teams should monitor Federal Register publication of the joint OCC-FDIC final rule and calculate the actual effective date rather than relying on the bulletin date.
• Internal audit and compliance functions may wish to preserve objective factual support for responses to MRAs and other supervisory communications, particularly where the bank believes an issue does not meet the new risk-based threshold.

What changed

Revised PPM 5310-3 replaces the May 25, 2023 version and structures the OCC enforcement framework around escalation, tailoring, and focus. The OCC generally intends to provide banks an opportunity to remediate deficiencies through supervision before initiating a Section 8 enforcement action, although it retains authority to act at any time when legally supportable and warranted.

Key dates

2026-08-27

OCC revised PPM 5310-3 and PPM 5400-11, issued Bulletin 2026-41, and published the proposed rulemaking notice concerning substantive and technical violations. The proposed rule's 30-day comment period begins only upon Federal Register publication.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to map open and recently closed MRAs and enforcement actions against the revised material-financial-risk threshold and the stated tailoring factors of capital structure, complexity, activities, and asset size.
• Banks should consider documenting objective facts, legal violations, financial-risk consequences, customer impact, duration, frequency, severity, and remediation status supporting the classification and closure of examination findings.
• Large and complex banks may wish to reassess escalation risk because the OCC expressly permits enforcement action for practices that might not produce the same response at a community bank.
• Banks should consider reviewing corrective-action plans to confirm that each action is directly tied to a specific deficiency and is proportionate to the risk, while preserving evidence of substantial compliance with existing orders.
• Compliance teams may wish to distinguish substantive violations from potential technical violations in issue-management inventories, including systemic or repeated conduct, customer restitution, books-and-records impacts, financial-condition effects, and insider misconduct.
• Banks should consider monitoring the Federal Register for publication of the proposed rule and calculating the 30-day comment period from that publication date; affected institutions may wish to submit comments on the proposed substantive-versus-technical framework.
• Examiners may identify lower-level weaknesses as supervisory observations rather than MRAs; banks should consider maintaining internal governance and risk records for such observations without assuming that the OCC may require a board action plan or track remediation in the same manner as an MRA.

What changed

Revised PPM 5310-3, Bank Enforcement Action and Related Matters, replaces the May 25, 2023 version and emphasizes escalation, tailoring, and focused corrective action. The OCC generally expects to provide a bank an opportunity to remediate deficiencies through supervision before taking an enforcement action under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, although it retains authority to act at any time when legally supportable.

Key dates

2026-08-27

OCC and FDIC issued the joint final rule through OCC Bulletin 2026-40. The bulletin applies to all OCC-supervised banks; it does not state the Federal Register publication date, effective date, or a firm compliance deadline.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should identify the final rule’s Federal Register publication and effective date, because the OCC bulletin itself does not state either date or a compliance deadline, and should monitor OCC and FDIC implementation guidance before relying on any transition treatment.
• Compliance teams may wish to inventory open MRAs, supervisory recommendations, enforcement matters, and examination findings and map each item to the final rule’s material-financial-risk, DIF-risk, actual-violation, or already-caused-harm criteria.
• Firms should consider separating board-level MRA remediation obligations from discretionary management responses to supervisory observations and documenting why a weakness is treated under one category rather than another.
• Risk and compliance functions may wish to enhance evidence files supporting assessments of likelihood, materiality, current and reasonably foreseeable conditions, and impacts on capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and market-risk sensitivity.
• Banks should consider documenting how supervisory requirements and remediation plans are tailored to asset size, complexity, activities, capital structure, and other financial-risk factors, particularly where the institution has heightened systemic, concentration, liquidity, or operational complexity.
• Legal and compliance teams may wish to distinguish actual violations of banking or banking-related laws and regulations from prudential weaknesses, because an actual violation can support an MRA without separately satisfying the prudent-operation and material-risk test.
• Boards and senior management should consider reviewing governance procedures so that MRAs receive required escalation and tracking while supervisory observations are clearly identified as non-binding potential enhancements.
• Firms should consider preparing a process for requesting and retaining the objective facts and reasoning underlying an MRA or unsafe-and-unsound-practice determination, as the rule requires examiners to share that basis.

What changed

An unsafe or unsound practice is now defined as a practice, act, or failure to act that is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation and either is likely, if continued, to materially harm the bank’s financial condition or present a material risk of loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund, or has already materially harmed the bank’s financial condition. “Likely” requires more than a merely possible risk; relevant financial-condition effects include impacts on capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk.

Key dates

2026-08-27

OCC and FDIC issued the final rule and OCC published Bulletin 2026-40 describing its application to OCC-supervised banks.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to map existing and anticipated MRAs, enforcement commitments, supervisory recommendations, and examination findings against the new material-financial-risk and actual-violation criteria.
• Firms should consider separating board-level corrective-action items from nonbinding supervisory observations and documenting why each issue does or does not meet the MRA threshold.
• Risk and compliance functions may wish to update issue-taxonomy and escalation procedures to assess impacts on capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, sensitivity to market risk, and the Deposit Insurance Fund.
• Banks should consider retaining objective evidence and documented reasoning supporting materiality assessments, including institution-specific factors such as asset size, complexity, activities, and capital structure.
• Management and boards may wish to review outstanding policies, process, and documentation findings to determine whether they remain mandatory remediation matters, are better treated as supervisory observations, or independently constitute violations of banking or banking-related law.
• OCC-supervised banks should monitor the related examination guidance and assess whether planned lookbacks, independent-consultant requirements, or suspicious-activity review scopes are affected by the revised supervisory approach described in industry reporting.
• Firms should track Federal Register publication and calculate the 60-day effective date once publication occurs; the August 27, 2026 announcement date is not itself the effective date.

What changed

An unsafe or unsound practice is now defined as a practice, act, or failure to act that is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation and either, if continued, is likely to materially harm the bank’s financial condition or present a material risk of loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund, or has already materially harmed the bank’s financial condition. Relevant financial-condition impacts include capital, asset quality, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk; reputation concerns unrelated to financial condition are excluded.

Key dates

2026-07-24

The FCA conducted the Attest quantitative survey of 666 UK adults aged 18 to 40 who owned investments or were considering buying investments within 12 months.

2026-08-27

The FCA published the press release and research findings on young investors' trust in AI.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to map all AI use cases across investment research, recommendations, suitability, appropriateness assessments, client communications, and financial promotions, distinguishing general-purpose tools from systems specifically configured to provide financial advice.
• Firms should consider assessing whether any AI-generated output amounts to a personal recommendation, regulated advice, or a financial promotion under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, rather than relying on the technology's general-purpose label.
• Firms using AI in regulated activities should consider applying the same suitability, appropriateness, customer understanding, disclosure, record-keeping, oversight, and accountability standards that apply to equivalent human-led processes.
• Customer-facing communications may warrant clear explanation that general-purpose chatbot outputs are not FCA-regulated advice and do not themselves create entitlement to FSCS compensation or access to the Financial Ombudsman Service.
• Compliance teams may wish to test AI outputs for hallucinations, stale or unsupported sources, misleading performance claims, inappropriate personalisation, bias, and inadequate risk warnings, with escalation and human-review controls for higher-risk outputs.
• Firms should consider reviewing whether AI-generated content used in promotions complies with the FCA financial promotion restriction in section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and applicable FCA financial-promotion rules.
• Governance reviews may include vendor due diligence, approved-use restrictions, audit trails, model-change monitoring, incident reporting, staff training, and controls preventing customers or staff from treating AI output as a substitute for regulated advice.
• Firms may wish to monitor the FCA's expected late-2026 publication on good and poor AI practice and any subsequent FCA, HM Treasury, or industry measures addressing advice-like outputs from general-purpose AI.

What changed

No binding regulatory requirement, rule, prohibition, or implementation deadline was introduced. The FCA clarified its current supervisory position that general-purpose AI chatbots are not regulated by the FCA where they respond to varied prompts and are not specifically established to provide financial advice, research, or decision-making support. By contrast, an AI tool specifically deployed to provide financial advice would be likely to fall within the FCA's remit and could engage the existing UK regulatory framework for regulated advice and financial promotions.

Key dates

2016-01-01

The period began during which the FCA found that the investor-visa scheme operated; the exact start date is not specified in the publication.

2019-01-01

The period ended during which the FCA found that the scheme operated; the exact end date is not specified in the publication.

2021-03-12

The FCA imposed restrictions preventing Dolfin from carrying on regulated activities, following concerns including its operation of the investor-visa funding scheme.

2021-06-01

Dolfin entered special administration; the exact date in June is not specified in the publication.

2022-02-17

The Home Office closed the Tier 1 investor visa route of entry to the UK.

2026-08-26

The FCA published the enforcement announcement concerning the bans, fines and Joukovski Decision Notice.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review whether any product or client arrangement could create a misleading impression that a regulatory, immigration or other statutory investment threshold has been met when the client’s own qualifying capital is materially lower.
• Firms should consider testing the end-to-end governance of immigration-linked investment business, including approval of the business model, ownership and control disclosures, conflicts management, introducer due diligence, fee flows and oversight of connected or offshore entities.
• Firms may wish to reassess source-of-funds and source-of-wealth controls where client investments are supported by loans, circular funding, guarantees or funds provided by affiliated entities, and document why the resulting structure is consistent with the relevant immigration and financial-services requirements.
• Senior managers and boards should consider whether regulatory submissions, notifications and attestations fully disclose shadow directorships, controllers, beneficial ownership, related-party involvement and the true commercial purpose of client arrangements.
• Firms should consider conducting targeted reviews of historical investor-visa or residence-by-investment clients, including communications and files supplied to regulators or other public authorities, and escalating any potentially misleading statement or omission through the appropriate remediation and notification processes.
• Training and surveillance may be reviewed to ensure staff understand that conduct outside the core regulated service, including assistance with immigration-rule circumvention, can affect the firm’s and individuals’ integrity, fitness and propriety.
• Where third-party immigration agents or introducers are used, firms may wish to assess their incentives, remuneration, representations to clients, due-diligence records and ongoing monitoring, particularly where fees are unusually high or linked to visa approval.

What changed

This is a final enforcement outcome for Nagy and Maraj, not a new generally applicable rule or supervisory requirement. Both were prohibited from performing any function in relation to regulated activities; Nagy’s discounted penalty was £324,800, compared with an undiscounted £464,000, and Maraj’s discounted penalty was £122,000, compared with an undiscounted £174,300. Joukovski was issued a Decision Notice proposing a prohibition order, but the proposed action has no effect pending the Upper Tribunal’s determination.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF published the administrative sanction imposed on BigRep SE.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should confirm whether each Luxembourg-home-State issuer in scope has published its annual financial report no later than four months after the end of the financial year under Article 3 of the Transparency Law.
• Firms should verify that half-yearly financial reports are published no later than three months after the end of the first six months of the financial year under Article 4 of the Transparency Law.
• Compliance teams may wish to test evidence of effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage with the Officially Appointed Mechanism for each periodic report.
• Issuer boards and senior management may wish to review escalation procedures for missed reporting deadlines and CSSF orders, including documented ownership, contingency arrangements and prompt remediation.
• Firms should consider maintaining an auditable reporting calendar that captures statutory deadlines, CSSF correspondence, publication timestamps, CSSF filings and Officially Appointed Mechanism confirmations.
• Issuers subject to a CSSF order should consider treating the order as a separately tracked remediation obligation rather than relying solely on completion of the underlying publication.

What changed

The CSSF imposed an administrative sanction on BigRep SE under the amended Luxembourg law of 11 January 2008 on transparency requirements for issuers. The decision concerns BigRep SE's failure to comply with the applicable requirement to publish periodic financial information and with related obligations concerning effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage through the Officially Appointed Mechanism. The sanction is an enforcement action against a specific issuer rather than a new rule or general regulatory amendment.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF publication of the administrative sanction against Corestate Capital Holding S.A.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams of Luxembourg-home-State issuers should obtain and review both PDFs linked to the CSSF publication to confirm the sanction amount, affected report, breached provision, reasoning and any required remediation.
• Issuers should consider testing their annual and half-yearly financial-reporting calendars against the applicable deadlines in Articles 3 and 4 of the Transparency Law, including controls for effective dissemination, filing with the CSSF and storage through the Officially Appointed Mechanism.
• Boards and senior management may wish to document ownership, escalation and evidence-retention arrangements for periodic-reporting deliverables, particularly where audits, restructuring, going-concern issues or delayed financial close could affect publication timing.
• Groups with repeated or historic reporting delays should consider a targeted review of prior CSSF correspondence, compliance with supervisory orders and the completeness of issuer disclosure controls.
• Legal and compliance teams should assess whether any appeal or procedural response is relevant after reviewing the decision; the publication page supplied does not state an appeal period.

What changed

The CSSF imposed an administrative sanction on Corestate Capital Holding S.A. The supplied publication page does not disclose the sanction amount, the precise reporting failure, the legal provision breached, or any remedial order; those details should be taken from the linked PDF decision before relying on them operationally. The publication does not itself introduce a new general obligation: the relevant existing framework is the Luxembourg Transparency Law of 11 January 2008, including its periodic-reporting, dissemination, storage and CSSF-filing requirements where applicable.

Key dates

2025-07-01

During July 2025, Effecta offered the relevant profit participation certificate to retail investors through a website without first publishing the KID. The source does not specify the exact day.

2026-07-30

BaFin imposed the €15,000 administrative fine on Effecta GmbH.

2026-08-21

BaFin’s English publication was current or updated on this date.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to inventory all products offered to retail investors and document the PRIIP classification decision for each product, including profit participation certificates and other structured or securities-like investments.
• Firms should consider implementing a hard pre-launch control that blocks retail subscriptions until the current KID is available on the relevant distribution website and the link, version and publication time have been recorded.
• Intermediaries may wish to allocate contractual responsibility between manufacturer, platform operator and distributor for preparing, approving, publishing, updating and removing KIDs, with evidence of completion retained for each offering.
• Online distributors should consider testing whether the KID is clearly accessible before the investor reaches the binding offer or subscription stage, is free of charge, can be downloaded and stored, and remains available on the required durable medium.
• Firms should consider maintaining audit trails showing the KID version displayed, publication timestamp, website location, investor notification and any periods during which an offering was paused because the KID was unavailable.
• Governance functions may wish to review supervisory oversight of product launches and assess whether escalation, sampling and post-launch monitoring would have prevented or detected a missing KID.
• Compliance teams may wish to review comparable offerings launched since July 2025 and remediate any period in which a PRIIP was presented to retail investors without a compliant KID, taking account of potential disclosure, distribution and customer-redress consequences.

What changed

This is an enforcement action rather than a new rule. BaFin applied Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, requiring persons advising on or selling a PRIIP to make the KID available to retail investors free of charge, in good time before they are bound by a contract or offer. The document may be supplied on paper, on another durable medium, or through a website meeting the Regulation’s conditions, including notifying the investor of the website address and location and keeping the KID accessible, downloadable and storable for as long as needed.

Key dates

2025-07-01

During July 2025, Companisto offered the relevant profit participation certificate to retail investors for subscription without having first published the KID. The source identifies the month but not a specific day.

2026-07-30

BaFin imposed the €9,000 administrative fine on Companisto Trust Service XXXV UG for a supervisory-duty breach connected with the Article 5(1) PRIIPs violation.

2026-08-20

BaFin published the English enforcement notice concerning the fine.

2026-08-21

The BaFin publication was updated and displayed the publication date of 21 August 2026.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should inventory products offered to retail investors and identify instruments that may constitute PRIIPs, including profit participation certificates and other structured or investment-linked products.
• Compliance teams may wish to maintain a documented PRIIP classification assessment for each product, including the rationale where an equity-like asset investment is considered outside the PRIIPs scope.
• Manufacturers should ensure that a final, approved KID is published on the relevant website before the product is offered or made available for subscription, with evidence showing the exact publication timestamp and the start of marketing.
• Firms should implement a launch gate preventing website publication, advertising, subscription opening or other retail distribution activity until the required KID has been approved and published.
• Product governance procedures should allocate responsibility among the manufacturer, platform, distributor and website operator for preparing, approving, uploading, monitoring and updating the KID.
• Compliance teams may wish to test archived web pages, subscription journeys and marketing records to confirm that retail investors could not subscribe before the KID became available.
• Senior management should receive exception reporting for any product launch where the KID is incomplete, unavailable, published late or hosted at a location that is not readily accessible to the relevant retail audience.
• Firms should assess whether existing organisational controls are sufficient to prevent or materially impede Article 5(1) breaches, because BaFin’s action shows that inadequate supervisory arrangements may be sanctioned separately from the underlying disclosure failure.

What changed

This is an enforcement action rather than a new rule or amended requirement. BaFin applied Article 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, which requires a PRIIP manufacturer to draw up and publish a compliant KID before a PRIIP is made available to retail investors. The sanctioned failure was not merely a defective document: the KID was not published on the website in good time before the subscription offer.

Key dates

2026-08-21

CSSF imposed and published the €10,000 administrative fine against Gaz Capital S.A. for non-compliance concerning the annual financial report for the year ended 31 December 2025.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to identify every security for which the firm has Luxembourg as its home Member State and confirm whether any Article 7 exemption applies.
• Issuers with a 31 December financial year-end should consider scheduling publication of the annual financial report no later than 30 April of the following year, subject to the applicable reporting-period and instrument requirements.
• Firms should consider maintaining evidence of timely publication, effective dissemination, submission to the CSSF and storage on the Officially Appointed Mechanism, including timestamps, responsible persons and vendor confirmations.
• Reporting calendars may be reviewed to ensure that audited financial statements, the management report and responsible-person statements are complete and approved sufficiently before the four-month deadline.
• Where a delay is possible, issuers may wish to escalate promptly to senior management, legal counsel and the CSSF and document the cause, remediation and communications plan; the sanction indicates that failure across multiple disclosure channels can be treated as non-compliance even where the underlying report is subsequently produced.
• The issuer may wish to assess whether to challenge the decision before the Tribunal administratif within the statutory three-month period.

What changed

No new regulatory obligation was introduced; this is an enforcement action applying existing requirements. An issuer for which Luxembourg is the home Member State must make its annual financial report public no later than four months after the end of each financial year under Article 3 of the Transparency Law, keep it publicly available for at least 10 years, effectively disseminate it, store it on the Officially Appointed Mechanism and file it with the CSSF.

Key dates

2021-01-01

The FCA’s permanent restriction on marketing speculative illiquid securities, including relevant mini-bonds and loan notes, to retail investors took effect under COBS 4.14.

2026-01-01

The UK regime regulating offers of securities to the public came into force under the Public Offers and Admissions to Trading Regulations 2024.

2026-07-16

Robert Goodhew and Andrew Stoneman of Kroll Advisory were appointed joint administrators of Woodville Consultants Ltd.

2026-08-20

The FCA publication was updated and warned consumers and market participants about risky mini-bonds, loan notes and related financial promotions.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams should inventory current and proposed promotions, introducer arrangements and distribution channels involving loan notes, mini-bonds, litigation funding, private credit or other potentially speculative illiquid securities.
• Firms should document the classification analysis under FCA COBS 4.14, including whether the security is speculative and illiquid, whether it is excluded from the restriction, and the precise exemption relied upon for any retail communication.
• Authorised firms should verify that every financial promotion is made or approved within the firm’s permission and competence, is fair, clear and not misleading under FCA Principle 7 and COBS 4, and contains sufficiently prominent explanations of capital-loss, liquidity, issuer-default and compensation-scheme risks.
• Firms should not rely solely on an investor’s self-certification as a high-net-worth or sophisticated investor; compliance teams may wish to test the basis, timing, wording and evidence for each investor-status declaration against the applicable Financial Promotion Order exemptions.
• Banks, payment firms and professional intermediaries should consider enhanced onboarding and transaction-monitoring controls for unusual high-yield investment flows, unexplained introducer commissions, overseas exchange references, trust structures and claims of FCA-regulated involvement that may create a misleading halo effect.
• Distribution agreements should clearly identify fees, commissions, conflicts and the party responsible for the promotion, with controls to prevent unauthorised introducers from soliciting UK retail investors or passing them to unauthorised issuers.
• Firms should assess whether a proposed public offer engages the Public Offers and Admissions to Trading Regulations 2024 and related FCA requirements, while treating that assessment as separate from financial-promotion, authorisation, conduct and investor-protection analysis.
• Relevant firms and professional intermediaries should retain evidence of due diligence, approvals, investor categorisation, risk disclosures, payment flows and complaints handling, and consider reporting suspicious activity or unlawful promotions to the FCA.

What changed

The FCA has reiterated that speculative illiquid securities, including most mini-bonds and loan notes, have been subject to a permanent restriction on their marketing to retail investors since 1 January 2021 under FCA COBS 4.14. The restriction does not make every loan note unlawful or bring every issuer within FCA authorisation; firms must separately assess whether the instrument falls within the restricted category, whether an exemption applies, and whether the promotion is made or approved by an authorised person in accordance with the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the...

Key dates

2020-01-01

The FCA's temporary product intervention restricting mass-marketing of speculative illiquid securities to retail investors took effect.

2020-12-10

The FCA published PS20/15, confirming permanent rules for marketing speculative illiquid securities, including speculative mini-bonds, to retail investors.

2021-01-01

The permanent FCA restrictions on mass-marketing speculative illiquid securities to ordinary retail investors came into force.

2026-08-19

The FCA published the consumer warning following continuing losses and concerns about unregulated loan notes and mini-bonds, including the collapse of Woodville Consultants Limited.

2026-08-20

The FCA page was updated; the publication continues to operate as a warning and supervisory or enforcement signal rather than a new rule.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to inventory all loan notes, mini-bonds, debentures, preference shares, and comparable securities promoted, approved, advised on, arranged, or distributed by the firm.
• Firms should consider testing each product against the FCA definition of a speculative illiquid security, including the denomination threshold of less than £100,000, the use of proceeds, transferability, listing, and the applicable exemptions.
• Authorised firms should consider blocking mass-market communications, including websites, social-media advertising, broad email campaigns, affiliate content, and introducer activity, where the promotion is likely to reach ordinary retail clients.
• Where an exemption is relied on, firms should consider evidencing investor eligibility, the basis for any high-net-worth or sophisticated-investor status, the timing and validity of the investor declaration, and controls preventing onward dissemination to ineligible persons.
• Firms approving or communicating relevant promotions should consider verifying that required risk warnings, loss-of-capital disclosures, liquidity and default information, and third-party fee or commission disclosures are accurate, prominent, and consistent across all distribution channels.
• Due diligence should consider whether claims such as asset-backed, secured, FCA-authorised security trustee, listed, or fixed return accurately describe the legal and economic position of investors.
• Compliance teams may wish to review introducer agreements, commission arrangements, marketing costs, investor-money flows, and the proportion of subscriptions actually applied to the underlying investment.
• Firms should consider checking that communications do not use artificial deadlines, pressure tactics, unrealistic return comparisons, or performance claims unsupported by a credible explanation of repayment capacity.

What changed

No new binding requirement or prohibition was introduced by this publication. The FCA restated that its permanent rules prohibit authorised firms from approving or communicating financial promotions for speculative illiquid securities in a manner likely to be received by retail clients, subject to defined exemptions.

Key dates

2018-05-01

Demetrios Hadjigeorgiou became CEO of SVS Securities Plc.

2019-08-02

The FCA required SVS to cease regulated activities, safeguard assets and notify affected third parties.

2019-08-05

SVS Securities Plc entered special administration.

2023-08-10

SVS Securities Plc was dissolved.

2024-04-25

The FCA issued its initial Decision Notice proposing an £84,600 penalty and prohibition order against Mr Hadjigeorgiou.

2026-08-19

The FCA published the settled enforcement outcome: a £56,400 fine and prohibition from senior management positions in financial services.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review whether senior managers have documented challenge and escalation responsibilities for investments involving issuer payments, commissions, related parties or other conflicts of interest.
• Firms should consider testing whether investment due diligence appropriately assesses product risk, liquidity, valuation methodology, concentration and suitability for pension and retail customers.
• Firms should consider reconciling all fees, commissions, retained spreads and exit-value adjustments against customer disclosures, ensuring that any reduction in redemption or sale value is prominent, timely and understandable.
• Boards and senior managers may wish to evidence periodic review of model portfolios against customers’ stated objectives, risk appetite, liquidity needs and pension-transfer circumstances.
• Compliance teams may wish to assess whether management information would have identified customer detriment, unusually high issuer-related income or investment decisions that prioritised firm revenue over customer interests.
• Firms should consider retaining clear records showing how conflicts were identified, mitigated, disclosed and challenged, including the rationale for approving high-risk or illiquid products for retail and pension-related portfolios.
• Authorised firms may wish to review the FCA’s SVS enforcement materials alongside their own senior-manager accountability maps and Statements of Responsibilities, while recognising that this case does not itself create a new universal obligation.

What changed

This is a concluded enforcement action against an individual, not a new general rule or threshold applicable to firms. The FCA imposed a financial penalty under section 66 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and a prohibition order under section 56 of that Act, following settlement and withdrawal of the Upper Tribunal referral. The FCA found a breach of Statement of Principle 6, requiring an approved person to exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm.

Key dates

2020-11-13

The High Court disqualified Howard Roland Duckett from acting as a company director for 10 years under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.

2020-12-04

The 10-year company-director disqualification took effect and is stated to run until 2030-12-04.

2025-11-20

The FCA identified this date in consumer communications as the point after which payments requested by Beauforce should be reported; the firm was restricted from regulated activities and ordered to stop accepting consumer money.

2026-08-18

The FCA announced the prohibition of Howard Roland Duckett from performing functions in relation to regulated activities.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review fitness-and-propriety checks for current and prospective senior managers, including searches for director disqualifications, litigation findings, insolvency events, and other adverse information.
• Firms should consider confirming that senior managers have disclosed all matters relevant to their approval and that changes affecting their fitness, propriety, or ability to perform an SMF are escalated and notified to the FCA where required.
• Firms should consider testing compliance with FCA Principle 11, COCON 2.2.4R, and SUP 10C.14.18R in relation to open, cooperative, and timely dealings with the FCA and notification of disqualifications or other relevant changes.
• Boards and compliance functions may wish to assess whether regulatory records, management-accountability maps, company-director registers, and evidence supporting senior-manager attestations are complete, consistent, and independently verifiable.
• Consumer-credit firms should consider reviewing controls over debt-management client payments, client-money safeguarding, communications, and contingency arrangements for transferring customers if permissions are restricted or withdrawn.
• Firms should consider screening current staff and approved persons against the FCA Financial Services Register and relevant Companies House director-disqualification information before appointment and periodically thereafter.
• Compliance teams may wish to use the case in senior-manager and conduct-risk training to reinforce that misleading the FCA or relying on fabricated information can independently support prohibition, even where the underlying misconduct occurred at an unrelated company.

What changed

The FCA made an individual prohibition order under section 56 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and withdrew Duckett’s approval to perform the SMF3 Executive Director and SMF16 Compliance Oversight functions under section 63 of that Act. This is an enforcement outcome against a specific individual rather than a new generally applicable rule. The underlying conduct included inadequate company records, repeated lies and reliance on fabricated evidence in High Court proceedings, and failure to notify the FCA of a director disqualification.

Key dates

2026-08-14

The SEC announced the enforcement action and filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

2020-12-01

Approximate beginning of the conduct period alleged by the SEC.

2025-06-30

Approximate end of the conduct period alleged by the SEC.

Suggested considerations

• Firms should consider reconciling every investor-facing statement about upfront fees, markups, commissions, carried interest, advisory fees, transaction spreads, and total acquisition cost against actual fund and affiliate-level economics.
• Compliance teams may wish to map all principal transactions and related-party transfers between advisers, sponsors, general partners, feeder funds, and portfolio-acquisition vehicles, with documented conflict reviews and valuation support.
• Firms should consider testing whether each person soliciting private-fund interests is properly registered or otherwise operating within an applicable broker-dealer exemption, and whether compensation arrangements create broker-dealer registration or supervision concerns.
• Compliance teams may wish to review cold-calling scripts, call recordings, lead-generation practices, sales-agent training, and escalation controls for high-pressure claims, guaranteed or implied returns, scarcity statements, and misleading descriptions of pre-IPO access.
• Firms should consider verifying offering exemptions, investor eligibility, registration status, subscription documentation, and disclosure delivery for each private fund and distribution channel.
• Compliance teams may wish to perform targeted surveillance of retail and retiree sales, including cancellation or cooling-off requests, unusual concentration, complaints about undisclosed fees, and differences between quoted and realized investor charges.
• Firms should consider preserving communications, transaction records, fee calculations, investor files, sales-agent compensation data, and valuation materials in anticipation of regulatory inquiries or investor claims.

What changed

This is a civil enforcement action, not a new rule or generally applicable safe harbor. The SEC alleges violations of the antifraud, securities-registration, and broker-dealer-registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, together with control-person liability and aiding-and-abetting violations by Spaventa.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review application of Individual Conduct Rule 1 (Integrity) and related training for senior managers and certified staff, using this case as a concrete example of prohibited behaviours such as falsification of documents and misleading regulators during transaction processes.
• Firms should consider revisiting governance and controls around change-in-control, acquisition and due diligence processes, ensuring that any representations to counterparties, the FCA or the PRA about ownership of assets, funding sources or balance sheet strength are independently verified and properly documented.
• Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SMCR) frameworks may need to be assessed to confirm that integrity risks are captured within fit-and-proper assessments under FIT, including checks on honesty in communications with regulators and counterparties and escalation processes where concerns arise.
• Legal and compliance functions may wish to review internal investigation procedures, including how interviews are conducted and recorded, to ensure that employees understand the expectation of candour and the potential regulatory consequences of providing false or misleading statements during internal investigations.
• Boards and risk committees at FCA-authorised firms should consider whether their culture and conduct risk programmes sufficiently stress the expectation of honesty in all regulatory engagement, and whether additional monitoring or attestations from senior executives involved in M&A or capital-raising transactions are warranted.
• HR and compliance teams may wish to update disciplinary and regulatory notification policies to reflect that dishonesty in external deal negotiations or in internal investigations can trigger regulatory reporting obligations and potential fitness and propriety concerns.
• Firms involved in potential acquisitions of regulated entities should consider implementing pre-clearance and compliance review steps for all documentation and representations provided to target firms, regulators, and advisers, focusing on verification of asset ownership and financial claims.
• Compliance monitoring plans may be enhanced to include thematic reviews of communications with regulators and key counterparties in high-risk transactions, assessing whether there is adequate oversight and evidence of accuracy and integrity.

What changed

This publication does not introduce new rules but illustrates the FCA’s application of existing powers under section 66 FSMA 2000 (financial penalties for misconduct) and section 56 FSMA 2000 (prohibition orders) to serious integrity breaches by senior managers. It reinforces the practical interpretation of Individual Conduct Rule 1 (Integrity) in the Conduct Rules sourcebook (COCON), showing that dishonest statements and falsified documents directed at counterparties and regulators in the context of acquisitions are treated as egregious misconduct.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to check whether any bundled, embedded, or referral-based cover could be characterised as insurance business requiring authorisation.
• Firms may wish to compare current products and distribution models against the licensing perimeter under the Short-term Insurance Act and Insurance Act.
• Compliance functions may wish to review complaint-handling controls to ensure perimeter issues are escalated promptly when customer complaints arise.
• Firms may wish to assess whether document-production and response procedures are adequate for FSCA investigations under the FSR Act.
• Senior management may wish to review governance over third-party arrangements and product approval processes where non-insurance businesses market insurance-like protection.

What changed

This is an enforcement outcome, not a new rule or consultation. The FSCA’s action confirms that operating an insurance-like business without the required short-term insurance authorisation can result in both a substantial monetary penalty and an individual debarment. The publication also indicates that obstruction or non-cooperation during an FSCA investigation can aggravate the matter and is treated as a breach of the Financial Sector Regulation Act framework.

Key dates

2026-03-02

FSCA press release and imposition of the administrative penalty

2026-10-01

Reported month for the Financial Services Tribunal reconsideration hearing

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review governance over financial statement preparation, approval, and publication, especially where multiple senior officers share responsibility.
• Boards and audit committees may wish to map who owns key judgments, assumptions, and escalation points for periodic reporting and integrated reports.
• Firms may wish to test whether disclosure controls cover annual reports, half-year statements, and market communications as a single control environment.
• Groups with complex structures may wish to examine how reporting responsibilities are allocated across parent and subsidiary functions before consolidated reports are issued.
• Senior management may wish to reassess personal accountability exposure for false or misleading market disclosures under South African market conduct law.
• Compliance functions may wish to monitor the Tribunal reconsideration process because the FSRA suspension mechanism affects the practical status of the penalty pending outcome.

What changed

This is an enforcement action, not a new rule or consultation. The FSCA found contraventions of sections 81(1)(a) and 81(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Act, 19 of 2012, which prohibit the direct or indirect making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements. The penalty was imposed under section 167(1)(a) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act, 9 of 2017, and includes reimbursement of the FSCA’s reasonable costs incurred in connection with the contravention.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review whether client-money segregation and reconciliation controls are robust enough to prevent commingling or unauthorized use of funds.
• Firms may wish to reassess governance over senior executives, key individuals, related-party payments, and delegated authority limits.
• Institutions handling payroll deductions or benefit contributions may wish to test whether payment flows, beneficiary remittances, and audit trails are transparent and independently traceable.
• Compliance functions may wish to review statutory reporting sign-off, escalation, and challenge procedures for anomalies or inaccuracies.
• Boards and risk committees may wish to consider whether ongoing fit-and-proper monitoring of key individuals is sufficiently documented and frequent.
• Firms relying on affiliated or outsourced intermediaries may wish to confirm counterparties’ licence status and the scope of their authorisation before continuing service arrangements.

What changed

The Foundation’s authorisation to act as a financial services provider was withdrawn under the FAIS regulatory framework, ending its licence-based ability to render regulated financial services. Two senior individuals were also debarred from rendering financial services for 30 years, and the FSCA imposed administrative penalties of R24 million and R20.7 million, respectively, based on reported misconduct including commingling client funds, misleading regulatory reports, failure to exercise proper care over funds, and unauthorised payments to themselves.

Key dates

2026-06-04

FSCA press release announcing administrative sanctions totalling R5.39 million

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review whether their risk management and compliance programme is current, documented, and aligned to FIC Act obligations.
• Firms may wish to test customer due diligence, beneficial ownership verification, and ongoing monitoring controls for consistency across onboarding and review processes.
• Compliance teams may wish to confirm that record-retention arrangements preserve required records for the statutory minimum period after a business relationship ends.
• Firms may wish to verify that FIC registration status and related governance records remain accurate and current.
• Boards and senior management may wish to assess whether escalation, remediation tracking, and internal testing are sufficient to evidence AML/CFT oversight under regulatory scrutiny.

What changed

This is an enforcement publication, not a rule change or consultation. The FSCA imposed administrative sanctions on Fairsure Administration (Pty) Ltd, Gray Swan Financial Services (Pty) Ltd, GQM Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd, and Louw Risk Financial Services CC for non-compliance with certain provisions of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001. The publication does not set out new statutory requirements, effective dates, or consultation deadlines.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to review mutual fund share class selection logic to confirm whether lower-cost eligible share classes were available and used where appropriate.
• Firms should consider whether 12b-1 fee revenue is fully identified in conflict inventories and disclosed clearly in Form ADV and related client materials.
• Advisory supervision may wish to test whether recommendations are consistent with a client-first or best-interest framework when fund share class options differ in cost.
• Firms may wish to evaluate whether exception handling for higher-cost share class usage is documented, approved, and supported by a client-specific rationale.
• Compliance functions may wish to assess whether remediation and restitution calculations are available if historical share class selection issues are identified.

What changed

This was not a new rulemaking or interpretive release; it was an SEC administrative enforcement action based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and inadequate disclosure tied to mutual fund share class selection and 12b-1 fee revenue. The SEC’s order indicates the firm recommended, purchased, or held higher-cost share classes for clients despite lower-cost alternatives being available, and the firm received compensation through 12b-1 fees that created a conflict.

Key dates

11 August 2026

- The Central Bank of Ireland published the warning notice naming **Abbey Croftson (CLONE)** as an unauthorised firm

Suggested considerations

• Block and escalate any customer or counterparty activity involving `abbeycroftson.com` or `[email protected]` for fraud and sanctions-style review, even though this is not a sanctions matter.
• Verify all new investment-firm counterparties against the Central Bank of Ireland’s unauthorised-firms list before onboarding, payment release, or referral acceptance.
• Review inbound complaints, payment instructions, and web leads for impersonation markers such as cloned names, copied addresses, or mismatched contact details.
• Update fraud and AML typologies to include clone-firm impersonation of regulated investment firms in Ireland.
• Notify relationship managers, operations teams, and front-line staff to escalate any contact from firms claiming to be Abbey Croftson or using similar branding.

What changed

• - The Central Bank has formally identified Abbey Croftson (CLONE) as an unauthorised investment firm / investment business firm in Ireland.
• The warning specifically lists the suspicious website as `https://abbeycroftson.com` and the email address used as `[email protected]`.
• The Central Bank states that the entity used details of a legitimate firm of a different name to deceive consumers.
• The Central Bank confirms there is no connection between the legitimate authorised firm and the fraudulent clone entity.
• The firm’s name has been published under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013.

Key dates

May 2026

– Timothy Zimmerman joins the SEC’s Division of Enforcement as a senior advisor to the Director, establishing the leadership base for the new unit

05 August 2026

– The SEC publicly announces the establishment of the Financial Reporting and Accounting Unit in the Division of Enforcement

Suggested considerations

• Conduct a targeted risk assessment of financial reporting and accounting controls, focusing on areas historically associated with SEC enforcement (e.g., revenue recognition, reserves, impairments, valuations, related-party transactions, and non-GAAP measures).
• Review and, where necessary, enhance internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material accounting judgments are robustly documented, reviewed, and escalated.
• Strengthen audit committee oversight of financial reporting and external audit, including regular discussions of SEC enforcement trends, known accounting risk areas, and the adequacy of management’s remediation of control deficiencies.
• Ensure that documentation of significant accounting judgments and estimates (including communications with external auditors) is complete, contemporaneous, and capable of withstanding regulatory scrutiny.
• Review external auditor engagement terms and governance, including partner rotation, independence safeguards, and responses to audit findings, to mitigate enforcement risk relating to audit quality and auditor misconduct.

What changed

• - The SEC has created a new Financial Reporting and Accounting Unit within the Division of Enforcement focused on accounting and financial reporting fraud and broader accounting and auditing...
• The new unit reflects an expanded enforcement capacity and prioritization for matters involving issuer financial statements, accounting judgments, internal controls, audit quality, and related...
• The unit will use a specialized staffing model, combining attorneys and accountants with technical skills in financial reporting, accounting, and auditing in the securities regulation context.
• The unit is expected to operate with enhanced cross-division coordination, working closely with staff across relevant SEC divisions and offices to ensure enforcement outcomes align with broader...
• The publication is an organizational/enforcement announcement, not a rulemaking, and does not introduce new disclosure requirements, filing obligations, or changes to accounting standards.

Key dates

05 August 2026

- CBI publishes the warning notice “Comgestfx (CLONE) – Central Bank of Ireland Issues Warning on Unauthorised Firm” under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, formally designating the entity as unauthorised and alerting the market

Suggested considerations

• Verify whether any clients, prospects, or staff have received communications from domains or email addresses associated with Comgestfx (CLONE), including http://www.comgestfx.com and [email protected], and block these from internal systems and client channels.
• Update internal scam and clone‑firm watchlists and negative screening lists to include Comgestfx (CLONE), ensuring that onboarding, transaction monitoring, and client servicing teams can identify and escalate any reference to the entity.
• Communicate a targeted client alert to relevant investors and distributors, reminding them to verify firms against the CBI’s authorisation registers and clarifying that Comgest Asset Management International Limited (CAMIL) is not connected to Comgestfx (CLONE).
• Review and, where necessary, enhance financial crime, fraud, and conduct risk policies to ensure they explicitly address clone‑firm risks, impersonation of authorised entities, and obligations to report suspected unauthorised firms to the CBI.
• Ensure customer‑facing staff, relationship managers, and call‑centre teams are briefed on this specific warning and can explain to clients how to check a firm’s authorisation status and the risks of dealing with unauthorised entities.

What changed

• - The CBI has formally designated Comgestfx (CLONE) as an unauthorised investment firm / unauthorised investment business firm, explicitly stating it is not authorised to provide investment services...
• The warning specifies the clone’s website (http://www.comgestfx.com) and email address ([email protected]), enabling firms and clients to identify and block known fraudulent contact points.
• The CBI confirms that Comgestfx has cloned the name and details of Comgest Asset Management International Limited (CAMIL), and that there is no connection between the authorised firm and the...
• The firm’s name is published under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, demonstrating the use of CBI’s statutory powers to publicly warn about unauthorised firms.
• The CBI reiterates its reporting channels for suspected unauthorised firms (telephone and online reporting), effectively re‑emphasising expectations that market participants and consumers will...

Key dates

05 August 2026

- The Central Bank of Ireland publishes the warning notice on **Comgestrade (CLONE)** and states that it is not authorised to provide investment services in Ireland

Suggested considerations

• Update fraud controls to flag clone-firm indicators, including impersonated names, copied addresses, and use of near-identical trading names. - Train frontline, onboarding, and complaints teams to treat unauthorised-firm warning notices as red flags requiring escalation and enhanced verification.
• Escalate suspected impersonation attempts to fraud, legal, and compliance teams immediately and preserve evidence of domains, emails, and communications for investigation. #

What changed

• - The CBI has formally identified Comgestrade (CLONE) as an unauthorised provider of investment services in Ireland.
• The CBI says the entity is using the website comgestrade.com and email [email protected] as part of the unauthorised activity.
• The CBI states that the entity cloned the identity of Comgest Asset Management International Limited (CAMIL) to mislead consumers.
• The CBI confirms there is no connection between the authorised firm and the fraudulent entity.
• The warning notice has been published under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, which places the matter in the formal public-warning framework used for unauthorised...

Key dates

05 August 2026

- CBI publishes the warning notice on Progestrade (CLONE) as an unauthorised investment firm / investment business firm under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013

Suggested considerations

• Implement or strengthen screening of all investment counterparties, introducers and online platforms against the CBI’s “Search Unauthorised Firms” list and the authorised firm registers before any client referrals or transactions.
• Update client‑facing communications, websites, and onboarding materials to include clear warnings about clone firms, including guidance to verify firm details via the CBI register and to be wary of unsolicited investment approaches.
• Review and enhance fraud, AML / financial crime and conduct‑risk controls to explicitly address clone‑firm typologies, including monitoring for use of your firm’s name, logo or authorisation details by third parties.
• Conduct an immediate internal sweep to identify any references to, or contact with, Progestrade (CLONE), progestrade.com, or [email protected], and block or blacklist these identifiers in client‑facing and internal systems.
• For authorised firms whose names or details are vulnerable to cloning, establish a formal incident‑response plan for brand and authorisation misuse, including escalation to the CBI and law enforcement.

What changed

• - The CBI has formally designated Progestrade (CLONE), using the website progestrade.com and email [email protected], as an unauthorised investment firm and unauthorised investment business...
• The CBI explicitly confirms that Progestrade (CLONE) has cloned the name and details of Comgest Asset Management International Limited (CAMIL), a legitimately authorised firm, and that there is no...
• The firm’s name is published as a warning notice under section 53 of the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, reinforcing the CBI’s supervisory and enforcement powers over...
• The CBI reiterates that firms and individuals can and should report suspected unauthorised firms directly to the Central Bank via the designated telephone line and reporting channels.
• The warning aligns with the CBI’s broader scam‑prevention messaging, directing consumers and market participants to its financial scams resources and the central list of unauthorised firms.

Key dates

August 2018

- EDMC established by the Court of Directors to provide independent decision‑making in contested enforcement cases and functional separation from investigation teams

January 2024

- EDMC Procedures published, setting out detailed processes for contested enforcement decisions, including panel composition and hearing arrangements

October 2025

- Bank of England commences recruitment for additional EDMC members, including a new Chair and Deputy Chair, to join in summer 2026

11 November 2025

- Closing date for applications for EDMC panel member roles, including potential Chair and Deputy Chair candidates

End of July 2026

- Term of Sir William Blair as EDMC Chair and of Philip Marsden as EDMC Deputy Chair expires

Suggested considerations

• Map all existing and potential enforcement exposures to the EDMC’s statutory remit, covering prudential regulation, FMI, resolution, securitisation, wholesale cash distribution, critical third parties and notes issuance.
• Review internal enforcement‑response playbooks to ensure they explicitly recognise the EDMC’s independent role and the January 2024 EDMC Procedures, including how contested cases will be heard and decided.
• Update board and senior management briefings on BoE/PRA enforcement to reflect the change in EDMC leadership and likely implications for contested case strategy and settlement versus contest decisions.
• Assess ongoing and anticipated enforcement matters for which the firm might contemplate contesting; incorporate the EDMC’s composition and procedures into litigation and regulatory strategy planning.
• Train Legal, Compliance and relevant business teams on the practical implications of the EDMC Procedures (panel size, hearing processes, written and oral representations, decision timelines) with scenario‑based exercises for contested cases.

What changed

• - The EDMC now has a new Chair (Nicholas Segal) and Deputy Chair (Peter King), replacing Sir William Blair and Philip Marsden whose terms ended in July 2026.
• The appointments are the outcome of an external recruitment process commenced in October 2025, aligned with the EDMC’s governance framework and five‑year renewable term structure.
• The scope of the EDMC’s remit continues to cover contested enforcement decisions across the Bank’s statutory regimes: Prudential Regulation, Financial Market Infrastructures, Resolution,...
• The EDMC Procedures, published in January 2024, remain the operative framework for how contested enforcement cases are handled, including panel constitution, hearing processes, and decision‑making...
• The EDMC continues to operate with functional separation from investigation teams and the Bank’s executive, preserving independence in contested enforcement decisions.

Key dates

2026-07-31

Policy becomes effective for authorized financial services provided to persons or entities located in Venezuela

2027-01-29 Deadline

End of the stated commitment period for the agencies’ enforcement-policy non-action position

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to confirm whether any Venezuela-related activity is specifically authorized under applicable OFAC sanctions licenses or other authorizations before relying on the policy.
• Institutions may wish to verify that their BSA/AML compliance program is currently in place and that they continue to make reasonable efforts to meet applicable BSA Requirements during the relief period.
• Firms may wish to review whether they have had a final BSA-related enforcement action by FinCEN or their primary federal regulator within the prior 24 months, as that would disqualify reliance on the commitment.
• Operational teams may wish to document the basis for treating transactions as covered authorized financial services in Venezuela and retain evidence supporting reliance on the enforcement-policy statement.

What changed

The agencies announced a temporary enforcement-policy commitment covering authorized financial services provided to persons or entities located in Venezuela from 2026-07-31 through 2027-01-29. During that period, the agencies state they will not take supervisory action, including citing a violation of law, or pursue an enforcement action against a supervised financial institution for BSA Requirement issues arising from such authorized services. The commitment applies only if the institution is currently compliant with an applicable BSA compliance program requirement and continues to make...

Key dates

2026-06-24

Venezuela experienced a pair of strong earthquakes off the northern coast west of Caracas, triggering the humanitarian crisis referenced by the agencies.

2026-07-27

FinCEN issued a substantively similar statement of enforcement policy regarding Venezuela-related financial services.

2026-07-31

The OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and NCUA issued the joint enforcement policy.

2026-07-31

Start of the period during which authorized financial services to persons or entities in Venezuela are covered by the enforcement commitment.

2027-01-29 Deadline

End of the covered period for the joint enforcement commitment.

Suggested considerations

• Compliance teams may wish to confirm whether current Venezuela-related activity falls within the scope of authorized financial services covered by the joint statement.
• Institutions may wish to verify that their BSA compliance program remains current and that ongoing controls reflect reasonable efforts to comply during the relief period.
• Firms may wish to check whether they have had any final FinCEN or OCC enforcement action involving BSA violations in the prior 24 months before relying on the policy.
• Sanctions teams may wish to confirm continued compliance with all applicable OFAC-administered sanctions regulations and authorizations.
• Institutions with Venezuela exposure may wish to document how they will evidence reliance on the policy and monitor the January 29, 2027 end date.

What changed

The agencies stated that eligible U.S. financial institutions that choose to provide authorized financial services to persons or entities in Venezuela will not be subject to supervisory action, including a citation for a violation of law, or enforcement action related to a Bank Secrecy Act requirement, for those services. The commitment is limited to authorized financial services provided from 2026-07-31 through 2027-01-29 and applies only to statutes or regulations specifically addressed in the joint statement.

Key dates

TBD (est. late 2026–2027)

- CBI will integrate the Supplemental Guidance with the Main Guidance on Fitness and Probity Investigations, Suspensions and Prohibitions as part of its wider implementation of a recent High Court judgment relating to F&P enforcement procedures

28 January 2026

- CBI launches Consultation Paper 166 on Supplemental Guidance relating to Prohibition Notices under the Fitness and Probity regime

11 March 2026

- CBI hosts an industry webinar on the Supplemental Guidance on Prohibition Notices under the Fitness and Probity regime

25 March 2026

- CP166 consultation period closes; CBI receives eight submissions from representative bodies and individuals

30 July 2026

- CBI publishes the final Supplemental Guidance on Prohibition Notices under the Fitness and Probity Regime and the Feedback Statement on CP166

Suggested considerations

• Update Fitness and Probity policies, procedures, and governance frameworks to explicitly address the possibility of Prohibition Notices, including criteria for escalation, internal investigation standards, record‑keeping, and engagement protocols with the CBI during prohibition-related processes.
• Ensure Board and senior management, including PCF role holders and HR/legal/compliance leads, are briefed on the new prohibition guidance, the publication policy, and the enhanced transparency of outcomes so that they understand the personal and organisational consequences of F&P failings.
• Strengthen documentation and retention of supervisory, disciplinary, compliance and performance records for CF and PCF holders to ensure that, if a prohibition is contemplated, the firm can provide a coherent, contemporaneous factual record to the CBI and the individual.
• Review and, where necessary, amend individual accountability frameworks (including Statements of Responsibilities and role profiles) to clearly delineate responsibilities, seniority and CF scope, given that these factors now explicitly influence the nature, scope and duration of any prohibition.
• Embed procedures to manage individuals who become subject to proposed or actual Prohibition Notices, including immediate role restrictions, notification workflows, communication protocols to boards and key stakeholders, and contingency planning for business continuity.

What changed

• - The Supplemental Guidance formally sets out the circumstances and general principles the CBI’s Prohibition Decision Maker will consider when deciding whether to impose a Prohibition Notice,...
• The guidance clarifies the decision-making framework for the nature, scope and duration of a prohibition, including whether it applies to specific controlled functions (CFs), parts of CFs, or any...
• The guidance codifies how a Prohibition Notice becomes effective, establishing that effectiveness arises either through a written agreement between the CBI and the individual concerned (prohibition...
• The guidance explains the three mechanisms by which a Prohibition Notice may be terminated or cease to have effect: (1) termination of a prohibition agreement by the CBI, (2) revocation of a...
• The Supplemental Guidance sets out CBI’s approach to requests by prohibited persons to terminate a prohibition agreement, including the factors CBI will assess when considering whether to lift or...

Key dates

31 December 2023

(assumed financial year end for 2023) – End of the 2023 financial year for Leo International Precision Health AG, starting the four‑month period for the annual financial information announcement

30 April 2024

– Latest permissible date for publishing the announcement stating from which date and at which web address the 2023 annual financial information is made publicly available (four months after year‑end)

30 June 2024

– Latest permissible date for publishing the half‑yearly financial report for the first half of the 2024 financial year (three months after the end of the reporting period, assuming 31 March 2024 as period end)

08 July 2026 Deadline

– BaFin imposes an administrative fine of €20,000 on Leo International Precision Health AG for failure to publish the required annual announcement for 2023 and the half‑yearly financial report for 2024 within the prescribed periods

30 July 2026

– Public announcement by BaFin of the enforcement measure and fine against Leo International Precision Health AG

Suggested considerations

• Map all WpHG‑related periodic reporting obligations (annual, half‑yearly, and any interim or ad‑hoc requirements) into a documented compliance calendar with responsible owners and system reminders well ahead of statutory deadlines.
• Implement a formal procedure to prepare, approve, and publish “Hinweisbekanntmachungen” that clearly specify the date and internet address of annual financial information, ensuring publication before the first public availability of the annual report and within four months of financial year‑end.
• Establish controls to guarantee that annual financial information is published both in the Company Register and on the issuer’s website, and that these publications are synchronised with the required announcements.
• Design and enforce a process for producing and publishing half‑yearly financial reports within three months after the end of each reporting period, including clear timelines for drafting, audit/review (where relevant), management approval, and technical website publication.
• Conduct a gap analysis of current financial reporting and disclosure procedures against WpHG requirements to identify any missing steps, unclear responsibilities, or weaknesses in escalation mechanisms for imminent deadline breaches.

What changed

• - Issuers domiciled in Germany with securities admitted to trading on an organised market in Germany must publish an announcement (“Hinweisbekanntmachung”) specifying the exact date and internet...
• The announcement on annual financial information must be published no later than four months after the end of each financial year and must be issued before the first public availability of the...
• Annual financial information must be made publicly available on the internet in addition to its disclosure in the Company Register (Unternehmensregister), and the announcement obligation relates...
• Issuers must publish a half‑yearly financial report no later than three months after the end of each reporting period.
• Failure to publish financial reports or the required announcements, or failure to do so within the prescribed periods, constitutes a contravention of the WpHG and exposes the issuer to administrative...

Key dates

January 2021

- Start of the period during which Financière Fonds Privés is found to have committed unauthorised placement and advisory breaches

October 2024

- End of the factual period examined by the AMF Enforcement Committee for the identified breaches

TBD (post‑21 July 2026)

- Potential appeal phase before the Conseil d’État; the decision indicates that an appeal may be lodged, so firms should monitor for any subsequent case law impacting interpretation of CIF professional obligations

21 July 2026

- AMF Enforcement Committee decision imposing fines of €100,000 on Financière Fonds Privés, €70,000 on Pierre‑Michel Deléglise, and €40,000 on Thierry de Chambure, and attributing all breaches to the two senior managers

28 July 2026

- Public announcement of the decision via AMF news release

Suggested considerations

• Review the firm’s regulatory status (CIF versus investment services provider) and ensure that any placement or capital‑raising activities are within authorised limits; discontinue or re‑authorise any non‑guaranteed placement services currently carried out under CIF status.
• Conduct a comprehensive mapping of all services and activities (advisory, marketing, introductions, distribution) to confirm that none constitute regulated investment services (e.g., non‑guaranteed placement) without the requisite AMF/ACPR authorisation.
• Inventory all remuneration flows from issuers and third parties, including commissions, retrocessions and fees, and assess whether they are compatible with any independence claims and MiFID II inducements rules; remove or re‑label “independent” branding where issuer remuneration is received.
• Update client‑facing documentation (engagement letters, brochures, websites, emails) to provide clear, accurate and non‑misleading information on adviser independence, remuneration model, and any relationships with issuers or introducers.
• Implement or enhance procedures to ensure a written suitability statement is produced and delivered to clients for each piece of investment advice, documenting client profile, recommended products and rationale; integrate this into advisory workflows and record‑keeping.

What changed

• - Financial investment advisors must not conduct non‑guaranteed placement services (service de placement non garanti) such as actively seeking subscribers on behalf of issuers, unless they hold the...
• Firms that present themselves as independent advisors must not receive remuneration (direct or indirect) from product issuers whose instruments they recommend, unless permitted under MiFID II/French...
• When claiming independence, firms must provide accurate, clear and non‑misleading information on the nature of their independence, remuneration model, and any relationships with issuers or...
• Financial investment advisors must issue a written suitability statement formalising the investment advice provided, setting out the client’s profile, the recommended products, and the reasons why...
• Pre‑contractual documentation must include full information on costs, fees and remuneration, covering both the advised investment and any business introducer partners; omission of these disclosures...

Key dates

19 September 2022 – 7 October 2022

- Approximate three‑week period during which LFSHK’s systems were restored in phases and clients could not trade via mobile app or internet platform, relying only on account executives to place orders

19 September 2022

- Ransomware attack on LFSHK’s critical IT infrastructure, affecting servers and core trading‑related systems

7 October 2022

- Completion of LFSHK’s system restoration following the ransomware attack

TBD (post‑incident)

- LFSHK conducted internal reviews and appointed an independent reviewer at the SFC’s request to assess the incident and cybersecurity internal controls; exact dates are not specified but occurred after the attack and prior to enforcement

TBD (enforcement publication date)

- SFC issues public disciplinary action reprimanding and fining LFSHK HK$2.1 million for misconduct relating to inadequate cybersecurity controls; the reference number indicates 2026 publication but the precise calendar date is not specified in the excerpt